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TANGIBILITY AS TECHNOLOGY 
João Marinotti* 
ABSTRACT 
Property law has traditionally relied on tangible boundaries to 
delineate legal thinghood and to inform the bounds of in rem rights 
and duties. Unfortunately, property doctrines have fossilized around 
tangibility, causing fragmentation in the legal treatment of digital 
assets. In the United States, for example, cryptocurrencies and 
non-fungible tokens (NFTs) may simultaneously be classified as 
commodities, securities, currencies, assets, or not property at all, 
depending on the jurisdiction, domain, or specific asset in question. 
This fragmented system of overlapping legal treatments increases the 
information cost of using digital assets, decreases efficiency, and 
ultimately hinders future innovation. 
In this Article, I propose a unified and tech-neutral approach to 
legal thinghood, providing a theoretically coherent and robust way to 
increase property law’s resilience in adapting to future technologies. 
Specifically, I deconstruct the conceptual purpose of tangibility in 
traditional doctrines of legal thinghood, uncovering its role as a 
technology (i.e., a tool) in property law to delineate rights. From this 
insight, I derive a coherent doctrinal test for distinguishing between 
digital assets that fulfill all conceptual requisites to be legal things 
and assets that do not. By doing so, I conclude that the traditional 
ontological categories of property law, such as choses in possession, 
are sufficiently robust to incorporate new and evolving digital assets. 
This tech-neutral approach paves the way toward an elegant and 
efficient legal treatment of digital assets and digital resource 
management in the twenty-first century. 
 
* Visiting Fellow at the Information Society Project, Yale Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; 
M.Sc., University of Edinburgh; M.Phil. & M.A., City University of New York; B.A., Columbia 
University. Many thanks to Henry E. Smith, John C.P. Goldberg, and Christopher T. Bavitz for their 
invaluable contributions to this piece, to the participants of the 2019 Harvard Law School Private Law 
Workshop, and to the Harvard Law School Project on the Foundations of Private Law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Property is the law of “legal things.” 1  It allocates ownership, 2 
facilitates social interaction, 3  and as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held, “empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny.”4 
State courts have even more staunchly highlighted the importance of 
property rights. For example, the Supreme Court of Texas has held 
“that strong judicial protection for individual property rights is 
essential to ‘freedom itself,’” noting that property rights are 
“‘fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, and not derived from 
the legislature,’ and ‘preexist even constitutions.’” 5  The Supreme 
Court of Iowa has even held that “property rights are . . . human 
rights.”6 Availing oneself of this fundamental right, however, first 
requires defining the very object of property law: the legal thing 
 
 1. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROP.: THE BASICS OF PROPERTY app. § 2 (AM. L. INST., Council 
Draft Sept. 13 2019) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT] (“A legal thing is a possible subject matter of 
legal relations that receives treatment as a separate whole and is no more than contingently associated 
with any particular actor.”); see also Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Convergence and Divergence 
in Systems of Property Law: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 787 (2019) 
(noting that “property law employs (legal) things”). 
 2. See James Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1168 
(2017) (“Two people cannot both be complete owners of the same thing . . . . It may take a moment to 
absorb this idea—precisely because it is so obvious—but it is fundamental to the structure of property 
law.”); see also John A. Humbach, Property As Prophesy: Legal Realism and the Indeterminacy of 
Ownership, 49 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 211, 224 (2017). 
 3. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849, 1850 (2007) (“Property is a device for coordinating both personal and impersonal interactions 
over things.”). 
 4. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (“Property rights are necessary to preserve 
freedom.”); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) 
(“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”). 
 5. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 804 (Tex. 2016) (cleaned up) (“Locke 
deemed the preservation of property rights ‘[t]he great and chief end’ of government, a view we echoed 
almost 300 years later, calling it ‘one of the most important purposes of government.’ Individual 
property rights are ‘a foundational liberty, not a contingent privilege.’” (first quoting JOHN LOCKE, 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. IX, § 124 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1980) (1690); then quoting 
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977); and then quoting Tex. Rice Land Partners, 
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline Tex.-LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 204 n. 34 (Tex. 2012))). 
 6. Iowa-Ill. Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 85 N.W.2d 28, 42 (Iowa 1957) (“Freedom is 
invaded when property rights are ignored . . . .”). The United Nations General Assembly has recognized 
property rights as human rights. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 17 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (noting that “[e]veryone has a right to own property,” and that “[n]o one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of [their] property”). 
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itself.7 When the asset in question is a physical plot of land or a bar 
of gold, the task of defining the legal thing is comparatively trivial.8 
What happens, though, when the resource in question is ephemeral 
information or otherwise purely digital? 9  Does the fundamental 
individual right of property no longer apply?10 This question looms 
larger and larger as digital assets continue to replace not only 
“sentimental [items] like letters, scrapbooks, home videos, and 
shoeboxes full of photos”11 but also financial assets.12 
The speed of technological innovation has forced judges and 
regulators to adopt a functional rather than formal analysis of 
property law to answer this question and to accommodate modern 
economic realities.13 These functional case-by-case analyses have led 
to fragmentation and confusion in the legal treatment of digital 
assets, including blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. 14  Just at the 
federal level, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 15  the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 16  the Internal 
 
 7. Chang & Smith, supra note 1 (“Property law identifies things . . . .”). 
 8. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 1894 (noting that we leverage our “robust and automatic 
prelegal intuitions” to sufficiently delineate the legal thing in question). 
 9. Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or Deleting 
Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 801 (2014) (“Digital assets include an individual’s 
email accounts, personal webpages, blogs, social networking sites, documents, videos, . . . photo storage 
sites . . . . [and] domain names or accounts with stored financial value like Pay[P]al or frequent flyer 
memberships. Digital assets may also include an individual’s valuable media purchased in electronic 
format such as movies, television shows, music, and books.”). 
 10. JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM 13 
(2017) (noting that because of “the intangibility and centralization of the internet and digital and 
information technologies . . . . [p]roperty ownership as we know it is under attack and fading fast”). 
 11. Banta, supra note 9, at 816. 
 12. Glen Fernandes & Walter Verbeke, Crypto-Assets: Crossing the Chasm?, 11 J. SEC. 
OPERATIONS & CUSTODY 292, 296 (2019) (“Some crypto-assets are already more likely to be on the 
path towards the mainstream of capital markets’ financial instruments . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification 
of Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22, 34 (2014). 
 14. See, e.g., Jean Bacon, John David Michaels, Christopher Millard, & Jatinder Singh, Blockchain 
Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to Distributed and Centralised Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. 
& TECH. 2, 84 (2018) (“[W]hether tokens qualify as property may depend on the legal context . . . since 
an item might qualify as property in some contexts but not in others.”). 
 15. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO 
Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-
131 [https://perma.cc/8L57-FYJT]. 
 16. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, 2016 WL 3137612, at *2 (Sept. 17, 2015) (“Bitcoin and 
other virtual currencies are . . . properly defined as commodities.”). 
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Revenue Service (IRS), 17  the Department of Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN),18 and the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FinRA) 19  have all had to independently 
determine the legal nature of Bitcoin before establishing whether and 
how they fall within each agency’s jurisdiction.20 
Judges, too, have relied on ad hoc, functional analyses in 
determining whether each cause of action can be applied to bitcoins. 
In cases of conversion, for example, courts seem to treat bitcoins as 
property but frequently note that Bitcoin’s legal status is far from 
determined. At the state level, a California superior court judge 
explained that “the law is unsettled whether bitcoin should be 
treated . . . as property for the purposes of various legal issues, [but] 
for the purpose of a claim for conversion bitcoin is fairly treated as 
property.”21 At the federal level, too, a district court judge in Florida 
stated: “Whether or not bitcoin is ‘money’ for the purposes of a 
conversion claim, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that they have 
sufficiently (and with specificity) alleged a claim for conversion.”22 
Without intervention, this functional, ad hoc approach to property 
law will not be limited solely to Bitcoin or cryptocurrencies.23 The 
 
 17. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A444-HBE5] (“For federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property.”). 
 18. Guidance, Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FIN-2013-G001, Application of 
FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies 3 (Mar. 18, 
2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVZ2-
9TRJ]. 
 19. Complaint at 1, Dep’t of Enf’t v. Timothy Tilton Ayre, Disciplinary Proc. No. 2016049307801 
(Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth. Off. of Hearing Officers Sept. 11, 2018); see also Anisha Reddy, 
COINSENSUS: The Need for Uniform National Virtual Currency Regulations, 123 DICK. L. REV. 251, 
271 n.170 (2018) (“Although FinRA is a non-profit organization, it is congressionally authorized under 
the Securities Exchange Act as a registered, self-regulatory securities organization for the broker-dealer 
industry.”). 
 20. For a discussion of how the SEC, the CFTC, the IRS, FinCEN, and FinRA have each assessed 
the legal nature of Bitcoin, see Reddy, supra note 19, 268–73. For a comparative analysis, see Michelle 
Alvarez, A Comparative Analysis of Cryptocurrency Regulation in the United States, Nigeria, and 
China: The Potential Influence of Illicit Activities on Regulatory Evolution, 25 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 33, 40 (2018). 
 21. Norman v. Strateman, No. 17-556483, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 884, at *2 (App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. Jan. 24, 2018). 
 22. Kleiman v. Wright, No. 18-CV-80176, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216417, at *46 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
27, 2018). 
 23. The ad hoc approach is also not limited to the United States. In Iceland, cryptocurrencies are 
banned; in Japan, they are a means of payment; in Canada, they are assets; while in Pakistan, they are 
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growing interest in smart contracts, 24  augmented reality, 25  and 
business models built on personally identifiable information, 26  for 
example, has reopened the debate about whether and how property 
law should be applied to each of these digital innovations. More 
recently, the sale of digital art and collectibles through non-fungible 
tokens (NFTs) for upwards of $69 million has also furthered the need 
to clarify the role of ownership and property law in this digital 
marketplace.27  
Some commentators have continued to propose functional, 
domain-specific solutions to these questions. For example, in the 
realm of digital police investigations, one proposal suggested the 
creation of a sui generis system of property-like law, which would be 
applicable only to internet service provider-held data.28 Rather than 
solve problems and reduce information costs, these domain-specific 
and tech-dependent rules would likely lead to rapidly obsolete 
policies, exacerbating the fragmentation and confusion surrounding 
digital assets as a whole29—just as they did for Bitcoin.30 Separate 
property regimes for tax law, administrative law, criminal law, and 
private law will not only increase transaction and information costs 
but may even undermine the role of private law as a tool for 
planning.31 Therefore, a single, unified, and tech-neutral approach to 
 
commodities. Polina Lyadnova, Ekaterina Dorokhova, & Hannah Whitney, Cryptocurrencies in 
Insolvency: Evasive Reality, EMERGING MKTS. RESTRUCTURING J., Summer 2018, at 1, 2. 
 24. See Adam Sulkowski, Blockchain, Business Supply Chains, Sustainability, and Law: The Future 
of Governance, Legal Frameworks, and Lawyers?, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 303, 337 (2019). 
 25. See David Jiang, Pokémon Go’s Virtual Trespass Suit Reaches Settlement Agreement, N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. BLOG (Mar. 7, 2019), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2019/03/pokemon-gos-
virtual-trespass-suit-reaches-settlement-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/DWZ5-9RYU]. 
 26. See Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 108 (2019). 
 27. See Sam Dean, $69 Million for Digital Art? The NFT Craze, Explained, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 
2021), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2021-03-11/nft-explainer-crypto-trading-
collectible. 
 28. Pollack, supra note 26. 
 29. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens 
When Technology Is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 561, 576–77 (2017). 
 30. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 835 (2015) (“Clean property 
rules should reduce information costs. Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service’s (‘IRS’) attempt to 
treat virtual currency as property for tax purposes does not.”). 
 31. Christopher K. Odinet, Bitproperty and Commercial Credit, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 649, 701–02 
(2017) (“A single perfection system for virtual property . . . would be greatly beneficial in simplifying 
the otherwise fractured way courts approach virtual property.”). 
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legally recognizing digital property rights is required.32 As Joshua 
Fairfield summarized, “[i]t doesn’t matter whether our environments 
are physical, virtual, or an augmented reality hybrid. As long as 
individual self-determination remains a human demand, the idea of 
property will exert a powerful draw on the human imagination.”33 
Ultimately, the “extension of property principles to digital assets 
is . . . inevitable.”34 
Questions about recognizing intangible personal property through 
a single, unified, and tech-neutral approach, however, have been 
circumvented in an attempt to avoid rekindling the older and still 
open debate: can intangible digital property exist at all? 35  The 
scholarly debate on “virtual” property, which largely focused on the 
virtual world of Second Life in the early years of the twenty-first 
century, 36  did not reach a conclusion. 37  Strong end user license 
agreements (EULAs) precluded the need for a theoretically robust 
answer to this question by redefining the ownership of digital assets 
to actually mean the ownership of intellectual property rights, 
contract rights, or licensing rights, such as those governing consumer 
 
 32. As technology permeates property law, the importance of a tech-neutral regime becomes 
increasingly important. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 24, 37 (2013) (nothing that “the importance of the technology-neutral stance” has 
been frequently cited in “fields that have direct encounters with technology, such as intellectual 
property, e-commerce, telecommunications, environmental law, and, in recent years, privacy law” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 33. FAIRFIELD, supra note 10, at 243. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Justin M. Ackerman, An Online Gamer’s Manifesto: Recognizing Virtual Property 
Rights by Replacing End User Licensing Agreements in Virtual Worlds, 6 PHX. L. REV. 137, 144–45, 
186 (2012) (stating that some scholars vehemently argued that “virtual items should be treated as 
property”). But cf. Christopher J. Cifrino, Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, Not 
Property Law, Must Be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds, 55 B.C. L. REV. 235, 264 
(2014) (stating that others believe that property rights over virtual assets “would be the end of the virtual 
world as we know it”). 
 36. See Ackerman, supra note 35, at 149–50 (“Modern virtual worlds [such as Second Life] 
are . . . ‘simulated social places . . . that feature software-animated objects and events . . . where users 
employ avatars,’ to interact with each other. A virtual world is also ‘persistent, meaning that actions 
taken and investments made in the simulation are expected by users to last some time,’ if not 
permanently.” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 9 (2010); and then 
quoting id. at 31)). 
 37. Virtual worlds such as Second Life are structured as online three-dimensional environments in 
which players can buy, sell, create, and destroy virtual assets. See generally Cifrino, supra note 35. 
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e-books and music. 38  These license agreements were arguably 
sufficient to handle the legal disputes arising from digital assets in 
the context of recreation and entertainment.39 However, contract law 
has not proven to be sufficiently robust to account for newer types of 
digital assets in light of economic and technological advancements.40 
Some fear that the traditional ontological categories of property in 
Anglo-American common law are simply inapplicable to intangible 
digital assets. 41  On the one hand, digital assets are not like the 
prototypical image of property: they are abstractions of what 
ultimately boils down to ones and zeroes; they can exist on your 
computer, in the cloud, or even on decentralized systems like 
blockchains; and they are not tangible, having no obvious physical 
boundaries. On the other hand, digital assets do share certain 
characteristics with tangible property: there is a growing societal 
reliance on their longevity, even after death, 42  and they must 
ultimately be stored on some physical medium somewhere in the 
world to exist. 
Given these characteristics, it may be unclear whether digital 
assets are legal things under existing property law. 43  Certain 
theorists, such as J.G. Allen, claim that digital assets simply cannot 
be classified into any existing category of property, whether as 
choses in possession, 44  choses in action, 45  or even incorporeal 
 
 38. For a discussion on how contract law has been applied to regulate virtual assets, see Fairfield, 
supra note 30, at 810. 
 39. Most notably, the virtual world of Second Life involved a legal dispute. See Bragg v. Linden 
Rsch., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 40. See J.G. Allen, Property in Digital Coins, 8 EUR. PROP. L.J. 64, 71 (2019). The EULA approach 
circumvents rather than answers “questions about the ontology of virtual objects. [Questions concerning 
virtual property] certainly have to be answered if we wish to understand legal relations concerning 
things like book-money, electronic securities, consumer data qua commodity—and now digital coins.” 
Id. 
 41. See id. at 65. 
 42. See, e.g., Banta, supra note 9, at 799. 
 43. By property law, I do not include intellectual property law, which governs nonrival information 
resources. This Article analyzes the law governing rival legal things and its application to digital assets. 
 44. For an explanation of choses in possession, see Pascale Chapdelaine, The Undue Reliance on 
Physical Objects in the Regulation of Information Products, 20 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 65, 93 (2015) 
(“Personal property (‘chattels personal’) is subdivided between ‘choses in possession’ and ‘choses in 
action.’ Choses in possession are generally associated with ‘tangible property’ (i.e., those, ‘unfixed 
movables perceptible by the senses and thus capable of actual physical possession,’) or ‘corporeal 
things, tangible, movable and visible[;] they are always in the possession of someone.’” (alteration in 
8
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hereditaments. 46  Therefore, Allen claims that the recognition of 
digital property rights will require a new category of property, “res 
digitales,” 47  involving “the development of sui generis 
rules . . . governing [digital property’s] possession, transfer, [and] 
abandonment.” 48  Similarly, Katie Szilagyi claims that “Bitcoin 
eludes conceptualization through traditional philosophical 
frameworks,”49 and ultimately proposes that “patrimony—a Roman 
law concept that persists in the civil law—provides a more coherent 
conceptual foundation for cryptocurrency property rights.”50 
Even if such proposals were doctrinally perfect solutions, each 
would require a radical overhaul of the very foundation of American 
property law. Such overhauls seem unlikely to occur, especially in 
time to address the onslaught of cases concerning digital property, 
cryptocurrencies, and NFTs that are surely to arise in the very near 
future.51 As Henry Smith notes, “aspects of the property system most 
 
original) (footnote omitted) (first quoting W.H. HASTINGS KELKE, AN EPITOME OF PERSONAL 
PROPERTY LAW 2 (3d ed. 1910); and then quoting CROSSLEY VAINES, PERSONAL PROPERTY 11 (5th ed. 
1973))). 
 45. For an explanation of choses in action, see id. at 93 (“‘[C]hoses in action’ are generally 
associated with ‘intangible property’ and are often negatively defined as ‘embracing all forms of 
property not involving actual possession or right of possession as a necessary incident . . . .’ Choses in 
action include debt, liquidated damages, promissory notes, shares, and copyright. ‘Choses in action’ 
originally referred to a tangible article which was in the possession of someone other than the owner: to 
recover it, the owner had to take an action at law, and later evolved to encompass ‘intangible rights 
existing only in contemplation of the mind, . . . all invisible and incorporeal rights.’” (footnotes omitted) 
(first quoting KELKE, supra note 44, at 2; and then quoting FRANK HALL CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 54 (1914))). 
 46. See Allen, supra note 40, at 79–80 (stating that incorporeal hereditaments are “a raft of 
intangible objects of significance in the feudal system that were treated like land” and include “some 
modern-sounding things such as franchises, offices, and rights of way”). 
 47. Id. at 66 (stating that the term res digitales is meant to parallel the terms “res corporales (i.e., 
physical things) and res incorporales (i.e., reified rights)”). 
 48. Id. at 100. 
 49. Katie Szilagyi, A Bundle of Blockchains? Digitally Disrupting Property Law, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 
9, 10–11 (2018) (“The availability of true digital assets has the potential to destabilize our theoretical 
constructs of what constitutes property, and correspondingly, property law.”); see also Kelvin F.K. Low 
& Ernie G.S. Teo, Bitcoins and Other Cryptocurrencies As Property?, 9 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 235, 
267 (2017) (“[P]roperty rights over bitcoins may well represent a truly unique and novel form of 
property altogether . . . .”). 
 50. Szilagyi, supra note 48, at 11; see also Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 165 (La. 1977) (“The civil 
law concept of patrimony includes the total mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to 
a person for the satisfaction of his economic needs.”). 
 51. See Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2067 
(2015). 
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closely associated with its architecture have changed little” and will 
likely continue to resist such change.52 Such overhauls, though, are 
only required because these proposals attempt to ensure that all 
digital assets, all res digitales, can be incorporated into a new 
property regime. But digital assets are not all the same. Certain 
digital assets may comply with already existing doctrinal 
requirements for property law, whereas others may not. In this 
Article, I analyze the characteristics of three types of digital assets to 
demonstrate how existing property doctrines, when applied in a 
tech-neutral fashion, can distinguish between digital personal 
property and non-property digital assets.53 Specifically, I demonstrate 
that certain assets, such as bitcoins,54 can indeed be treated as legal 
things and thus inherit and benefit from the body of property 
doctrines already in existence. I also demonstrate that NFT-based 
collectibles, as they currently exist, fail the test of legal thinghood—
in spite of their reliance on blockchain technologies—and are 
therefore not governed by contemporary property law. 
Instead of asking whether all digital assets could be legal things 
within a hypothetically overhauled system of property law, we should 
be asking whether certain digital assets are already legal things 
within the existing categories of property law.55  In this Article, I 
argue, through a single, unified, and tech-neutral approach, that 
certain digital assets are indeed legal things. I further propose that 
this approach will position property law as a resilient foundation of 
private law in the face of evolving technologies while also addressing 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. See BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/CV94-N879]. For a thorough introduction 
to blockchain technology and the economics of Bitcoin, see generally ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH 
BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW MILLER & STEVEN GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND 
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016). 
 55. Some have proposed that bitcoins do fit within the traditional property category of 
(dematerialized) documentary intangibles. See, e.g., Tycho de Graaf, The Qualification of Bitcoins As 
Documentary Intangibles, 27 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1051, 1051 (2019). This categorization is 
unsatisfactory because documentary intangibles such as “stock, shares, policies of insurance, and bills of 
lading were declared by the courts to be choses in action,” serving solely to reify preexisting in 
personam rights to facilitate “the movement of capital in secondary markets.” Allen, supra note 40, at 
82–83. Bitcoins, as I demonstrate, are not choses in action and, therefore, are categorically not 
dematerialized documentary intangibles. 
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a current theoretical question: how do we coherently distinguish 
between digital assets that are property and those that are not? 
This Article proceeds in the following order: in Part I, I first apply 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s framework of rights and duties to 
derive a narrow working definition of property rights; I demonstrate 
that even under this narrow definition, tangibility is merely a 
technology (i.e., a tool) to delineate in rem rights; I then apply this 
finding to formulate a tech-neutral definition of a legal thing, the 
object of property law. In Part II, I leverage this definition to derive a 
test for legal thinghood; I then analyze three case studies to 
demonstrate how certain, though not all, intangible digital assets 
should be considered property when applying a tech-neutral and 
robust reformulation of the definition of legal things. 
Ultimately, I conclude that we do not need to alter the traditional 
ontological categories of property to adequately recognize the 
existence of intangible digital property. Rather, new types of digital 
assets, including Bitcoin, may directly align with traditional notions 
of property within existing doctrines.56 This indicates that the future 
legal treatment of digital property may, counterintuitively, rely on the 
existing analytical characteristics of legal things when applied in a 
tech-neutral manner. 
I. TECH-NEUTRAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
This Article began with a single and seemingly simple statement: 
property is the law of “legal things.”57 I have shown how this unified 
premise has been overshadowed by domain-specific functional 
approaches towards the regulation of digital assets and how such 
approaches are likely to lead to rapidly obsolete policies that 
intensify legal fragmentation and confusion.58 How, though, should 
 
 56. See, e.g., Henry S. Zaytoun, Cyber Pickpockets: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, and the Law of 
Theft, 97 N.C. L. REV. 395, 397 (2019). 
 57. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1; see also Chang & Smith, supra note 1 (noting that 
“property law employs (legal) things”). 
 58. Fenwick et al., supra note 29. 
11
Marinotti: Tangibility as Technology
Published by Reading Room, 2021
682 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
we determine whether a digital asset is a “legal thing” under a unified 
approach? 
A straightforward way to answer this question would be to first 
define the set of criteria necessary for something to be property—a 
legal thing—and then determine whether any digital asset fulfills 
these criteria. For some property theorists, this would be an easy 
question to answer because tangibility itself would be a requisite 
criterion for rivalrous assets to be legal things.59 Such an approach 
has been adopted by German civil law, for example, where tangibility 
is a statutory requirement for personal property (the law of Sache, in 
German, i.e., res). 60 
While discussing bitcoins, Allen rationalized this criterion by 
noting that “intangible object[s] capable of physical possession” 
would form an “unstable category” of property.61 Similarly, Szilagyi 
claimed that “[b]itcoins are something [entirely] new: they have no 
physical analogues” and that “the concept of [such] rivalrous 
intangible property has not previously been considered at law, or in 
 
 59. See, e.g., Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Defining Property Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 219, 220 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013) (“[W]e reach 
the conclusion by employing a Hohfeldian analysis, and we argue that it compels us to give a narrow 
definition to property rights, limiting such rights to cases where the rest of the world is under a prima 
facie duty to A not to deliberately or carelessly interfere with a physical thing.” (emphasis added)). 
 60. Andreas Rahmatian, A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal 
Property Law, 3 J. COMP. L. 197, 201 (2010) (“In German law, the meaning of ‘thing’ (res) is narrower 
than in other legal systems. For the purpose of the law, a thing (Sache) is defined . . . as comprising 
physical objects only.” (citation omitted)). Intangibles are also protected by statute in German law:  
Section 903 only applies to tangibles, but a number of other statutes cover a great 
variety of intangible ownership interests. For example, interests in the nature of debts, 
such as mortgages, unsecured debts on land, and debts on personal property are 
covered by sections such as section 1204 of the [German Civil Code]. Freedom of 
construction is guaranteed and arises from the German Constitution. Patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks are likewise protected. Private ownership also applies to 
causes of action, hunting licenses, leases, and the right to run a business. Owners are 
granted broad recovery rights for infringements and violations of their exclusive 
interests, and the enforcement of property interests is ensured by an adequate number 
of attorneys and a well-developed judiciary 
O. Lee Reed & Florian A. Stamm, The Connection Between a Property-Based Legal System and 
National Prosperity: Example from a Divided Germany Reunified, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 573, 
592–93 (2005). 
 61. Allen, supra note 40, at 87 (emphasis added). In other work, I address how the concept of 
possession is indeed applicable to certain intangible assets, providing further evidence that foundational 
property concepts do not depend on tangibility. See generally João Marinotti, Possessing (Digital) 
Property (Ind. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 447, 2021), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3834643. 
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legal theory.” 62  Even judges have leaned on statements such as 
“[n]othing in our [current] frame of references allows us to accurately 
define or describe Bitcoin.”63 
The ubiquity of this tangibility criterion, alongside the admittedly 
exciting idea that Bitcoin could be something entirely new to law, 
may have led to premature conclusions that overlooked the actual 
similarities between bitcoins and other personal property. For 
example, bitcoins may be simultaneously lost to the owner, not in 
anyone else’s control, and still in existence. These three 
characteristics, respectively, demonstrate that bitcoins are separable 
and alienable, exclusive and rival,64 and not simply reified rights.65 
This constellation of attributes is one “which the common law 
[recognizes] as a characteristic of choses in possession.”66 Why, then, 
is it not straightforward to categorize bitcoins as choses in 
possession, or in other words, a type of legal thing? 
Perhaps the reason is vestigial. The similarities between these 
types of digital assets and traditional in rem property rights (i.e., 
choses in possession) were not envisioned during the earlier 
 
 62. Szilagyi, supra note 49, at 16 (emphasis added). 
 63. State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016). 
 64. The ability to exclude would fulfill James Penner’s “exclusion thesis” that “the right to property 
is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.” 
JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) [hereinafter PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW]; see also J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 711, 743–44 (1996) (“The right to property itself is the right that correlates to a general duty that 
all others have to exclude themselves from the property of others. It is a right of exclusion, certainly, but 
it is not the right physically or by order or otherwise (say by putting up fences) to actually exclude 
others from one’s property. The fact that we may not have the right to throw trespassers off our land, 
and must call the police to do so instead, for instance, does not mean that we do not have a right to the 
land, but only that our means of effecting the right are circumscribed. This element of the right to 
property is brought out when the court is faced with claims to novel kinds of property, such as property 
in news, sporting events, or information. The court does not ask whether the claimant has the right to 
effectively exclude the putative trespasser or thief from the supposed property, by not publishing news 
stories, or by building a wall obstructing the view of an event, or by keeping information secret; it asks 
whether the putative trespasser or thief has a duty to exclude himself from it.”). 
 65. Reified rights are legal rights “treated by the law as if [they] were a thing” but represent an 
obligation that can be enforced by law. Allen, supra note 40, at 72. Reified rights include intangibles 
such as choses in action (e.g., debts and shares) where “a legal right (the ‘action’)” may be bought and 
sold as if it were a thing. Id. 
 66. Joanna Perkins & Jennifer Enwezor, The Legal Aspect of Virtual Currencies, 10 
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 569, 570 (2016) (noting that these are not the 
characteristics of a chose in action). 
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academic and judicial discussions of Second Life’s virtual resources. 
The growing diversity in the characteristics of digital assets provides 
us with the necessary context to revisit the role of tangibility in 
defining legal things. 
A. The Rights of Owners and the Duties of Non-Owners 
A comprehensive analysis of the entirety of property law and 
theory is surely outside the scope of this Article, but whether one 
adheres to a bundle-of-sticks analysis of property,67 an essentialist or 
architectural view of property,68 or any other property theory,69 it is 
relatively uncontroversial that property rights to a legal thing contain 
at least: (1) some sort of a “right to use,” and (2) some sort of a “right 
to exclude.”70 This pair of rights can be formalized into a seemingly 
 
 67. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (3d ed. 2017) 
(“Many theorists adopt a . . . conception of property as a collection (‘bundle’) of rights, with content that 
varies according to context and policy choices.”); see also, e.g., David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, 
The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 39, 43 (2000) (“[T]he right to exclude is one of the most important sticks in the bundle of 
rights that comprise private property.”). For an application of the bundle-of-sticks approach to 
intellectual property, see, e.g., Paul M. Schoenhard, Who Took My IP?—Defending the Availability of 
Injunctive Relief for Patent Owners, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 211 (2008), showing that 
“[v]iewed from this ‘bundle of rights’ perspective, . . . the right to exclude [from a patent is] ‘one of the 
most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.’ Patent rights are thus properly 
recognized as property rights within the purview of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982)). 
 68. The essentialist view of property stems from the perspective of “property as a right to a thing 
good against the world.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 67; see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property 
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others is more than 
just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non. Give someone the right 
to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the human demand for 
it, and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.”); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?: The Disintegration of the Restatement 
of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 708 (2014) (stating the “imminent architecture in the law of 
property [is] . . . grounded in a basic commitment to owners’ exclusion rights, modified by select 
governance regimes that respond to problems generated in part by transaction costs”). 
 69. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property As a Web of 
Interests, 26 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 281, 364 (2002) (“The image of property as a web of rights is an 
alternative metaphor that courts, legislatures, lawyers, and scholars may wish to consider. The web of 
interests metaphor builds on judicial and popular attention to the things people own and on theories 
advancing values as diverse as environmental stewardship, a pragmatic-feminist ethic of human 
flourishing and personhood, and utilitarian protection of economic expectations. It envisions property as 
an interconnected web of relationships between people and an object, and among people.”). 
 70. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 232 (“Proponents of the ‘bundle of rights’ view 
typically describe an owner of a thing as having both a ‘right to use’ the thing and a ‘right to exclude’ 
others from the thing.”). But this Article’s focus is not to claim that these two rights comprise the 
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concrete working definition of legal thinghood focusing on the rights 
of owners. This so-called “internal” approach defines property 
through “the property owner’s perspective on his or her own 
situation.”71 
t is a legal thing if, when owned by X72: 
a) X has a ‘right to use’ t; and 
b) X has a ‘right to exclude’ any non-owner Y from 
using or accessing t.73 
When attempting to apply this definition, two interpretive issues 
immediately emerge. What exactly are the “right to use” and the 
“right to exclude”? For example, can there be any limits on an 
owner’s right to use an asset, or would such asset no longer constitute 
a legal thing? Must an owner actively exclude any non-owner for an 
asset to be considered property? 
An economic analysis of property attempts to answer these 
questions through what is called the Hawk/Dove Game, wherein the 
hawk represents the owner and the dove represents the non-owner.74 
In this game, hawks protect their possession with force, and doves 
 
metaphysical core of property; rather, this Article’s focus on these two rights stems from their general 
acceptance and from the implications derived from a tech-neutral reanalysis of these rights. 
 71. Carol M. Rose, Psychologies of Property (and Why Property Is Not a Hawk-Dove Game), in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 59, at 272, 281. 
 72. Note that this is a preliminary definition that is progressively refined in the remainder of this 
Section. Throughout this Article, I refer to asset t, owner X, non-owner Y, and action a. For readability 
and because of the scope of this Article, the definition above solely addresses the characteristics of t 
when owned (or, for the purposes of this Article, possessed). A more complete definition of legal 
thinghood would also encompass the characteristics of t when not owned or possessed. This and 
subsequent definitions of legal thinghood could be restated as: t is a legal thing if and only if (iff): {(a) 
when owned or possessed by X: { . . . }, (b) when not owned or possessed { . . . }[, (c) . . . ]}. In other 
words, being owned or possessed is not a requisite for legal thinghood. The definition merely asserts 
that if legal thing t were owned or possessed, then the enumerated rights would be entailed. In the 
alternative, if the enumerated rights are conceptually not applicable to t, regardless of whether t is 
owned or possessed, then t would not be a legal thing. 
 73. Access is used as a “rough prox[y] . . . to protect a range of uses.” Henry E. Smith, 
Semicommons in Fluid Resources, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 195, 198 (2016) (referring to 
“[t]respass and the ad coelum rule [as] . . . prototypical methods of implementing such a[n exclusion] 
strategy”). Therefore, access and use may be two sides of the same coin, for the purposes of our first 
working definition. 
 74. Rose, supra note 71. 
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refrain from theft for fear of getting hurt. As Carol M. Rose 
summarizes, under this theory “all respect for property comes from 
fear on the part of the non-owner.”75 A hawk has an unlimited right 
to use its things but must actively protect them against intrusions by 
doves. In this game, if the hawk does not actively protect its things, 
doves are no longer afraid of the hawk and thus have no reason not to 
take its things. 
This cannot be the whole story, however, because in real life: 
(1) the right to use is, in fact, limited by at least “[n]uisance law, 
zoning, and environmental regulation,” 76  and (2) the “non-owner 
shows respect for the owner’s property even when the non-owner has 
little reason to fear the owner’s defence.”77 In fact, Rose claims that 
“the core attribute of property is precisely that the non-owner 
respects the owner’s claim even when it is not defended.” 78  The 
non-owner’s perspective, then, must play a contributing role in our 
definition of legal things. This shift in perspective, from the owner to 
the non-owner, pushes our model into what is called an “external” 
approach where “the psychological state of the non-owner, who is 
confronted regularly with things that belong to others,”79  plays a 
crucial role in determining what is and is not property. 
James Penner’s famous parking lot example illustrates this 
conceptual realignment.80 Imagine Sam strolling through a parking 
lot. Sam walks past a car. She does not know whether the car is 
owned by Jessie, or whether the car is on loan to Jessie’s cousin, or 
whether the car has just been sold to Jessie’s friend. What Sam does 
 
 75. James Penner & Henry E. Smith, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY 
LAW, supra note 59, at xv, xxvi. 
 76. Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 202 (2017). 
 77. Rose, supra note 71. 
 78. Id. at 283. 
 79. Id. at 281. 
 80. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 64, at 75–76 (“As I walk through a car 
park, my actual, practical duty is only capable of being understood as a duty which applies to the cars 
there, not to a series of owners. For all I know, all the cars are owned by the same person. The content of 
my duty not to interfere is not structured in any way by the actual ownership relation of the cars’ owners 
to their specific cars. By the same token, if one of the cars has just been sold, so that there is a new 
owner, or if one of the cars has been lent to the owner’s sister-in-law, again, my duty has not changed 
one whit. Thus transactions between an owner and a specific other do not change the duties of everyone 
else not to interfere with the property.”). 
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know, however, is that she does not own the car. From this single 
piece of information, Sam (i.e., the non-owner) acknowledges and 
upholds her duty not to take the car.81 
Can this external approach help answer the original question of 
whether bitcoins—or any other digital assets—are legal things? A 
formalization of “the psychological state [and legal status] of the 
non-owner”82 does indeed lead to a more precise definition of legal 
things, which is then used to demonstrate that certain digital assets 
are legal things. This analysis also highlights the central role and 
mechanics of shared social customs and intuitions in tech-neutral 
property doctrines. 
1. Hohfeldian Claim-Rights, Liberty-Rights, and Duties 
The initial working definition of legal thing, as the owner’s right to 
use and right to exclude, insufficiently accounted for (1) limits on the 
owner’s right to use (e.g., through nuisance law or environmental 
regulations), and (2) the non-owner’s duty to respect property, even 
when unprotected. To address these deficiencies, a Hohfeldian 
reformulation of these dual rights will be explored through the lens of 
information theory and the New Private Law.83 Although Hohfeld’s 
full paradigm of “jural opposites” and “jural correlatives” is not 
necessary for this analysis, the definitions of claim-rights, duties, 
liberties, and no-rights are helpful in formalizing the definition of 
legal thing. 84  The arguments in this Article do not require the 
adoption of universal rights correlativity nor do they promote the 
Hohfeldian reductionism of property law made prevalent by the 
American legal realists. 85  Rather, the rights, duties, and liberties 
 
 81. Rose, supra note 71, at 283 (“[M]ost non-owners are not larcenists, and they do not like 
larcenists. . . . [Y]ou do not have to guard your things all the time, because the ‘world’ of non-owners 
respects your ownership.”). 
 82. Id. at 281. 
 83. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920). 
 84. See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Analysis of Property Rights, 16 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 31, 31 (1996); Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 232. 
 85. For an analysis of some analytical problems inherent in Hohfeld’s paradigm, see generally David 
Frydrych, Rights Correlativity, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT 
PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam Balganesh, Ted Sichelman, & Henry Smith 
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referred to may be taken as merely descriptive and of relevance only 
in this context. 
According to Hohfeld’s classic framework: (1) claim-rights are 
those rights which correlate to duties, meaning that X’s claim-right 
and Y’s duty “are two sides of the same coin”;86 (2) duties are simply 
defined as legal obligations to do or not do a (an action); 87  (3) 
liberty-rights, unlike claim-rights, do not correlate to duties. X’s 
liberty to do a is a descriptive statement noting that there is no person 
Y who has a claim-right that X not do a;88 and (4) no-rights correlate 
to liberties,89 such that if X has a liberty to do a then Y has a no-right 
over X’s liberty to do a.90 
Although these definitions are written with a, referring to an action 
as the object of rights, liberties, and duties, the definitions are equally 
applicable to t (a thing). For those who adopt Hohfeld’s requirement 
that jural relationships be solely interpersonal, such a proposition 
may be controversial, as Hohfeld himself asserted that a “right in rem 
is not a right ‘against a thing.’”91 Thankfully, this concern can be 
addressed in two ways. First, without hindering the work’s main 
points, readers may reinterpret jural relationships written with t as 
 
eds., forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023807. For a critique of 
Hohfeldian reductionism, see J.E. PENNER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A RE-EXAMINATION 56 (2020). The 
Hohfeldian reductionism of property law into an enumeration of independent rights “grants the 
Hohfeldian [theorist] the assumption that, in principle, at any time one could provide a complete 
snapshot of A’s legal position, expressed as a series of Hohfeldian jural relations between identified 
individuals. . . . [But] this does not amount to an analysis. It provides no insight into the norms that 
make up the law and, indeed, it tends to obscure them because, purporting to be fundamental, it suggests 
that nothing further needs to be said.” Id. 
 86. Thomas D. Perry, A Paradigm of Philosophy: Hohfeld on Legal Rights, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 41, 42 
(1977) (“Mr. A’s right-claim that Mr. B shall do or forbear from doing X is correlative to B’s duty to do 
or forbear; they are two sides of the same coin.”). 
 87. HOHFELD, supra note 83, at 38 (“A duty or legal obligation is that which one ought or ought not 
to do. . . . When a right is invaded, a duty is violated.”). 
 88. Perry, supra note 86 (“[A]s between A and B, A may be at liberty to do X—that is, B will have no 
legal right in the strict sense that A shall not do it—but this does not mean that B is under any duty 
toward A.”). 
 89. HOHFELD, supra note 83, at 38–39. 
 90. The relationship between these four terms can be summarized from a first person perspective as 
follows: (1) “if I do not have a right to [do a], I have a no-right to it; and if I do not have a duty to do 
[a], then I have a liberty-right or am at liberty not to do it,” (2) “if I am not at liberty to do [a], then I 
have a duty not to do it,” and (3) “if it is not the case that I have a no-right to [do a], then I have a right 
to it.” Perry, supra note 86. 
 91. HOHFELD, supra note 83, at 74. 
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merely shorthand for the set of all “multital” jural relationships 
person X may have with all other individuals over (or concerning) t.92 
Even in this approach, however, the importance of legal thinghood 
and discernable boundaries is noteworthy because it is through the 
“thing” that an “in rem right can be easily broadcast to a large and 
indefinite set of duty bearers.”93 
The second and more substantive solution, however, may be that 
Hohfeld’s statement does not rule out jural relations with legal 
things; rather, his statement merely clarifies that property rights (e.g., 
fee simple) cannot be represented solely by a single claim-right 
against an object. Instead, an in rem property right is “a complex 
aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and 
immunities.”94 Indeed, as Ted M. Sichelman noted: “the core jural 
relations that are regularly used in the law [such as fee simple 
property ownership] are often compact ‘modules’ of complex 
Hohfeldian relations that serve to reduce the information costs 
involved in doing actual legal work.” 95  Not only does Hohfeld’s 
work on complex aggregates inform the formulation of the right to 
use and right to exclude in this analysis of property, it also reinforces 
the idea that the definition of property is a multi-part “compact 
module” of jural relations, which “reduce[s] the information costs 
otherwise involved in delineating the full set of Hohfeldian 
entitlements inhering in property.”96 
 
 92. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1917) (“A multital right . . . is always one of a large class of fundamentally 
similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) 
but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people.”). 
 93. Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Scaling Up Legal Relations, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY 
HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES, supra 
note 85 (manuscript at 14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3091652. 
 94. Hohfeld, supra note 92, at 746. 
 95. Ted M. Sichelman, Very Tight “Bundles of Sticks”: Hohfeld’s Complex Jural Relations, in THE 
LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 85 (manuscript at 2), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947912. 
 96. Id. (“I propose that the modular ‘thing’ approach to reasoning about property and other legal 
concepts is not only consistent with—but indeed identical to—a ‘bundle’ approach, at least one that that 
properly takes account of the complex network of legal relations, actors, and actions that constitute 
‘property’ and other high-level legal concepts.”). 
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As such, the four fundamental jural relationships defined above 
contain the analytical tools necessary to address the inadequacies of 
the initial working definition of property. The right to use and the 
right to exclude will be reformulated into a set of claim-rights, duties, 
liberties, and no-rights, which elucidate the role of tangibility in 
property law. 
2. The Right to Use: Owners’ Liberty-Right to Use 
What exactly is the right to use? Starting with Simon Douglas and 
Ben McFarlane’s explanation,97 an owner’s “right to use” a thing is a 
liberty-right: 
[W]hen an owner claims that he has a “right to use” his 
thing, he is not normally asserting that others owe him a 
legal duty to behave in a certain way; rather, he is asserting 
that he himself is permitted to behave in a certain way, 
i.e.[,] to use his chattel or his land. Put a little differently, 
when A [or X] claims that he has a “right to use” his thing, 
he is asserting that he is under no legal duty to B, C, 
D . . . etc.[,] not to use his thing and, in the absence of such 
a duty, his use is permitted. When an owner asserts a 
“right” in this sense, the better word is “privilege” or 
“liberty” . . . .98 
As stated above, this liberty to use is nothing more than a 
descriptive assertion of fact. It is an assertion that an owner is legally 
permitted to engage in certain uses of a thing. The right to use then 
 
 97. Although I ultimately disagree with Simon Douglas and Ben McFarlane’s reliance on tangibility, 
their proposed Hohfeldian reformulations of the right to use and right to exclude are used as the next 
step in formalizing our working definition of legal thing. See Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 
240. 
 98. Id. at 226 (“[A]s Cave, J., said in Allen v. Flood: ‘it was said that a man has a perfect right to fire 
off a gun, when all that was meant, apparently, was that a man has a freedom or liberty to fire off a gun 
so long as he does not violate or infringe anyone’s rights in doing so, which is a very different thing 
from a right the violation or disturbance of which can be remedied or prevented by legal process.’ As 
Cave, J., thus noted, an owner’s ‘right to use’ his thing, being no more than an assertion that his use is 
legally permitted, is more accurately described as a ‘liberty to use.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Allen v. 
Flood [1898] AC 1 (HL) at 29)). 
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can be formalized, though somewhat convolutedly, as a set of all 
possible manners of using a thing for which there is no person to 
whom the owner has a duty not to use the thing in such manner. 
Simply put, an owner’s liberty-right comprises the set of all possible 
uses of a thing which the owner does not have a duty to avoid. 
For example, let us imagine that is it 11:59 AM, and Amy, a 
Nebraskan high school student, is sitting at her desk beside an open 
classroom window impatiently waiting for the lunch bell to ring. On 
Amy’s desk is her pen. She plans on using her pen in some way to 
relieve her boredom but has not yet decided exactly how. Beside her 
pen is a heavy algebra textbook, which Amy rented by signing an 
agreement to return the book unaltered. In her dire boredom, she 
wants to engage in one of the following activities: (1) angrily throw 
the pen out of the open window; (2) write some profanity on the 
algebra textbook; (3) doodle on her arm; or (4) teleport her pen a few 
inches to the right. Which of these options fall within Amy’s 
liberty-right? To answer this question, we must ask from which of 
these uses does Amy have a duty to abstain. 
In Nebraska, “[a]ny person who deposits, throws, discards, or 
otherwise disposes of any litter on any public or private 
property . . . commits the offense of littering” and “shall be guilty of 
a Class III misdemeanor.”99 Whether or not she is aware of this law, 
she has a duty not to throw her pen out of the window because doing 
so would constitute littering.100 Statutorily, then, throwing her pen 
out of the window is not within her liberty-right to use her pen. 
Amy signed a contract under Nebraska law to rent her algebra 
textbook. In the contract, Amy agreed to return the book unaltered 
without any profanity. Therefore, regardless of whether Amy actually 
read the contract, she has a duty not to write in it.101 Contractually, 
 
 99. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-523 (2012); see also State v. Martinez, No. A-19-207, 2019 WL 
5595582, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2019) (“Littering is a Class III misdemeanor. . . . A Class III 
misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum of [three] months’ imprisonment.”). 
 100. Satterfield v. State, 109 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Neb. 1961) (“‘Ignorantia Juris neminem excusat’ 
(Ignorance of law excuses no one) is a maxim sanctioned by centuries of experience.”). 
 101. Eicher v. Mid Am. Fin. Inv. Corp., 702 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Neb. 2005) (“[O]ne who signs an 
instrument without reading it, when he can read and has the opportunity to do so, cannot avoid the effect 
of his signature merely because he was not informed of the contents of the instrument.” (quoting Bock 
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then, writing profanity in the textbook is not within her liberty-right 
to use her pen. 
Pen ink is a “minimally toxic substance” and may, if ingested, 
possibly lead to “occasional [gastro-intestinal] upset.”102 That being 
said, Amy does not have a duty to refrain from drawing on her own 
skin. Therefore, doodling on her arm is well within her liberty-right 
to use the pen, though it may not be the best idea. 
Lastly, Amy has no magical powers. She does not know how to 
teleport the pen. There are no laws or contracts barring Amy from 
teleporting the pen. Without further analysis, one could potentially 
determine that, in spite of her inability, teleporting the pen is within 
Amy’s liberty-right to use. However, teleportation is not a possible 
use; it is an impossible use. This distinction means that even if 
teleportation is not prohibited, it is also not within the set of all 
possible uses that comprise Amy’s liberty-right to use. 
If something cannot physically occur, it is definitionally not a use 
case that can be allowed or prohibited. If teleportation becomes 
possible, it will then enter into the set of possible uses which Amy is 
allowed to engage in, subject to statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
prohibitions.103 Such an approach enables an intentional, as opposed 
to extensional, method of defining in rem rights; the “delineation of 
rights is often not undertaken until it is necessary,” and property 
rights may presumptively grant owners the liberty to engage in newly 
possible uses as a “starting point for legal analysis.”104 
Therefore, out of all four options, Amy’s liberty-right to use the 
pen only currently includes doodling on her arm. When a use is 
 
v. Bank of Bellevue, 434 N.W.2d 310, 316 (1989))); see also Universal Sur. Co. v. Jed Const. Co., 265 
N.W.2d 219, 221 (Neb. 1978) (“[O]ne who does not read a contract before signing it cannot relieve 
himself of its burdens.”). 
 102. Michael A. McGuigan et al., Guideline for the Out‐of‐Hospital Management of Human 
Exposures to Minimally Toxic Substances, 41 J. TOXICOLOGY: CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 907, 910 (2003). 
 103. Although this example focuses on teleportation, the point is larger. The allowance of a use 
cannot be defined in reference to its current state of (im)possibility. As our technological abilities 
change at an ever-increasing pace, newly possible abilities (or uses) will then be entered into the set of 
all possible uses subject to an owner’s duties to avoid. If no shared social custom or intuition exists 
about such new uses, then legislative intervention (as in Kansas’ “Fence In” statute example described 
infra) or time may eventually lead to a determination of whether such newly possible use is within or 
without an owner’s liberty-right (i.e., that an owner has a duty to avoid such use). 
 104. Gold & Smith, supra note 93 (manuscript at 8–9). 
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statutorily prohibited, contractually prohibited, or is not a possible 
use at all, it is not within one’s liberty-right. 
This definition may seem somewhat tautological because it is 
merely referential to duties externally imposed on an owner rather 
than substantive itself. But that is the point: limitations on an owner’s 
right to use are not a hindrance to legal thinghood but rather an 
integral part. By defining owners’ right to use in reference to their 
external duties to anyone else, the right to use is definitionally 
circumscribed.105 Though new possible uses may be presumed to be 
within owners’ liberty-right,106 the limits to their right to use derive 
from any and all of their duties created through “[n]uisance law, 
zoning, and environmental regulation,” 107  or the like. From this 
analysis of the right to use, the working definition of legal thing is 
now: 
t is a legal thing if, when owned by X: 
a) X has a liberty-right to use t;108 and 
b) X has a ‘right to exclude’ any non-owner Y from 
accessing or using t. 
This new definition alleviates concerns that property rights may 
prevent government regulation of digital assets. 109  Environmental 
regulations and anti-money laundering statutes, for example, would 
simply impose duties onto owners not to use their legal things in 
defined ways. As the Supreme Court of California stated: 
Although one owns property, he may not do with it as he 
 
 105. One could imagine a situation in which X’s external duties to Y are so stringent that X has no 
more ways in which X is allowed to use t. Would t still be X’s property? As I will discuss in the 
following Section, the right to exclude will ensure that X’s liberty-right to t will include at least a 
liberty-right to exclude Y (alongside the claim-right discussed below). 
 106. Gold & Smith, supra note 93 (manuscript at 8–9). 
 107. Wyman, supra note 76. 
 108. In each revised definition of legal thing, I use italics to represent the change stemming from each 
analytical step. 
 109. Christopher Serkin, The Missing Rung: Challenging Regulatory Barriers to Property 
Acquisition, 6 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 275, 278 (2017) (“Strong protection for private 
property substantially limits regulatory authority, and vice versa.”). 
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pleases, any more than he may act in accordance with his 
personal desires. As the interest of society justifies 
restraints upon individual conduct, so also does it justify 
restraints upon the use to which property may be devoted. 
It was not intended by these constitutional provisions to so 
far protect the individual in the use of his property as to 
enable him to use it to the detriment of society. By thus 
protecting individual [property] rights, society did not part 
with the power to protect itself or to promote its general 
well-being.110 
This more accurate definition also begins to shed light on one of 
the possible roles of tangibility in property law. As stated above, an 
owner’s liberty-right to use comprises the set of all possible uses of a 
legal thing that the owner does not have a duty to avoid. To define 
such a set, we first “need to know what the resource [i.e., the legal 
thing] is” 111  before determining “what actions are allowed with 
respect to that resource.” 112  This question refers to “the 
‘compositional’ dimension of property rights: what collection of 
attributes is treated as a unit for describing permitted or forbidden 
activities.”113  
If I own a 1990 Toyota, may I use the brand-new BMW parked 
down the street? As much as I might want to, the answer is surely 
and unfortunately no. The bounds of my liberty-right do not extend to 
the BMW. I must first be able to determine what the asset is and, 
therefore, the bounds of my liberty-right to determine which uses are 
allowed or prohibited.114 
 
 110. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 345 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74, 79 
(1980); see also Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 401 P.3d 712, 719 
(Mont. 2017) (noting the “Legislature’s constitutional duty to maintain and provide for a clean and 
healthful environment . . . [by] protecting our environment in balance with the right to use and enjoy 
private property free from undue government regulation”). 
 111. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. High school student Amy, in the example supra, needed to understand the bound object that was 
her pen before brainstorming its possible uses. Just as with Amy’s pen, X’s contractual or regulatory 
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When an asset is tangible, determining the collection of attributes 
that is treated as a unit, and therefore the bounds of my liberty-right, 
is rather straightforward because it frequently relies heavily on 
deep-seeded perceptual biases.115 Even in infancy, human cognition 
shows a propensity to categorize and assign identities to “solid 
objects,” or “bodies that are cohesive, bounded, spatiotemporally 
continuous, and solid or substantial.”116 The perceptual salience of 
tangible boundaries in defining the collection of attributes that is 
treated as a thing is demonstrated by the fact that even infants 
“conceptualize solid objects in a way that distinguishes them from 
non-solid substances”117 and assign meaning and value to bounded 
objects more quickly than to unbounded substances.118 
Tangibility, therefore, leverages the cognitive effects of human 
perception to delineate the collection of attributes treated as the 
single unit, defining the bounds of an owner’s liberty-right in the 
process. Tangibility, in this way, has served as a rough proxy for 
discreteness, 119  for treating or intuiting the asset as “a separate 
whole,” 120  and ultimately for the ability to clearly delineate the 
boundaries of an owner’s liberty-right. Our question, however, is not 
whether tangibility helps define property; rather, our question is 
whether tangibility is conceptually required to define an owner’s 
right to use.  
 
duties also alter the bounds of X’s liberty-right. 
 115. Note that as used here, bias is not normatively negative. Rather, perceptual biases are commonly 
analyzed as “simple heuristics in complex, unfamiliar, uncertain, and/or time-constrained situations 
because we can only process a limited amount of the available information.” Johan E. Korteling, 
Anne-Marie Brouwer, & Alexander Toet, A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias, 9 
FRONTIERS PSYCH., Sept. 2018, at 1, 2 (describing the standard “cognitive-psychological” perspective 
on cognitive and perceptual biases). 
 116. Nancy N. Soja, Susan Carey, & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Ontological Categories Guide Young 
Children’s Inductions of Word Meaning: Object Terms and Substance Terms, 38 COGNITION 179, 183 
(1991) (noting that solid objects “move as connected wholes, independently of one another, on 
connected paths though unoccupied space”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Lance J. Rips & Susan J. Hespos, Concepts of Objects and Substances in Language, 26 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1238, 1240–41 (2019). 
 119. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2063 (2012) (“The 
property strategy applies to ‘things’—discrete resources.”). 
 120. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1. 
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Tangibility is not required. It is not tangibility but rather an 
“obvious” boundary around the liberty-right that is required to define 
X’s liberty-right to use t.121 The word “obvious” is perhaps no more 
helpful than our starting point—the “right to use”—but through the 
analysis of the right to exclude, a working definition of “obvious” is 
addressed below. Thus, our definition becomes: 
t is a legal thing if, when owned by X: 
a) X has a liberty-right to use t 
i. X’s liberty-right has an obvious boundary; and 
b) X has a ‘right to exclude’ any non-owner Y from 
accessing or using t. 
Notably, in this analysis, tangibility has been used as a 
“technology,” meaning a tool, method, or manner of accomplishing a 
task. 122  Specifically, tangibility has been used to ensure a clearly 
delineated liberty-right to use. In Section I.B, below, tangibility’s 
role as a technology is further clarified and expanded upon to 
demonstrate how other cognitive effects, shared social customs, and 
intuitions can perform the same function as tangibility with equal 
success. But property doctrines have calcified around the proxy, the 
technology, instead of its conceptual purpose. Before clarifying and 
expanding upon this argument, its consequences, and the definition 
of “obvious” below, I now turn to the second prong of our working 
definition of legal things: the right to exclude. 
3. The Right to Exclude: Non-Owners’ Duty Not to Interfere 
The right to exclude requires reformulation to account for the fact 
that the “non-owner shows respect for the owner’s property even 
 
 121. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 239. The authors used the term “obvious boundary” in 
delineating the non-owners’ duty not to deliberately interfere, but the same obvious boundary standard 
applies to other Hohfeldian jural relationships, such as this liberty-right. Id. 
 122. Technology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/technology 
[https://perma.cc/97RS-RDVD] (defining “technology” as “a manner of accomplishing a task especially 
using technical processes, methods, or knowledge”). 
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when the non-owner has little reason to fear the owner’s defence.”123 
Beginning again with Douglas and McFarlane’s analysis, the right to 
exclude can be analyzed as a Hohfeldian claim-right. 124 It imposes 
onto non-owners a duty. 
The “right to exclude,” as a claim-right prima facie binding 
on the rest of the world, correlates to duties owed by the 
rest of the world to [X]. This legal duty can be readily 
inferred from tort law. A tort, which is a type of civil 
wrong, involves the breach of a legal duty. This means that 
if a third party, let us say [Y], is held to have committed a 
tort by physically interfering with [X]’s chattel or land, we 
can infer from [Y]’s liability in tort law that he is under a 
legal duty to [X] . . . not to physically interfere with [X]’s 
thing. It is the law of torts, therefore, which recognizes that 
the holder of a clear property right in a thing is owed a 
legal duty by all others not to physically interfere with the 
thing.125 
Specifically, this reanalysis concludes that the owner’s right to 
exclude is the non-owner’s duty not to “deliberately or carelessly 
interfere” with the legal thing.126 Such a duty also entails that asset is 
rival. Nonrival goods, such as intellectual property, information, or 
data, “can be copied or emulated freely. Moreover, each copy or 
instance can be put to simultaneous parallel uses without direct 
mutual interference.”127 Other than for purposefully tortious reasons, 
non-owners have no reason to interfere with an owner’s nonrival 
asset when they could make full use of it (or a copy of it) without 
inflicting any interference onto the owner. Therefore, implied in the 
 
 123. Rose, supra note 71, at 282. 
 124. See Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 240. 
 125. Id. at 224 (cleaned up). 
 126. See Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59. For those that reject such identity relationships in the 
context of rights correlativity, this statement can be read descriptively as X’s right, in this context, 
coexists with Y’s duty. See supra note 80 and accompanying discussion. 
 127. Konrad S. Graf, Commodity, Scarcity, and Monetary Value Theory in Light of Bitcoin, 3 J. 
PRICES & MARKETS 52, 56 (2014). 
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non-owners’ duty not to deliberately interfere is the rivalrousness of 
legal things.128 
Returning to Penner’s parking lot example, the “actual, practical 
duty” of the pedestrian strolling through the parking lot is, in fact, the 
stroller’s duty not to interfere with any car that the stroller does not 
own. 129 The true owner of each car, whoever it is, imposes a duty 
onto non-owners not to interfere with that car. This duty applies 
regardless of who the owner is, where the owner is, or what the 
owner intends to do with the car. As a matter of general practice, 
then, “non-owners are expected to and often do respect others’ 
property rights,” regardless of whether the non-owner knows 
anything about the owner. 130  The owner’s right to exclude must, 
therefore, be defined solely in terms of the non-owner. From this 
analysis of the right to exclude, the working definition of legal thing 
is now: 
t is a legal thing if, when owned by X: 
a) X has a liberty-right to use t 
i. X’s liberty-right has an obvious boundary; and 
b) All non-owners Y have a prima facie duty not to 
deliberately or carelessly interfere with rival asset t. 
B. Tangibility and Obvious Boundaries 
Douglas and McFarlane’s ultimate conclusion, which I refute in 
the following Subsection, is that a Hohfeldian analysis leads to a 
“narrow definition” of property rights, limiting such rights to 
“physical thing[s].”131 In other words, they require that legal things 
 
 128. One could make the argument that it is not t that must be rival, but rather the use of t. This 
reformulation would open the door to incorporate intellectual property and other nonrival intangible 
assets with statutorily rival uses into our theory. However, if t were not a rival asset, owner X’s right to 
exclude would be interpreted as a right to economic monopoly. Non-owner Y’s interference would need 
to be that of owner X’s economic monopoly rights, not of X’s right to exclude X from access or 
non-economic use of t. Future analysis will be helpful in determining whether nonrival assets with 
statutorily rival uses will fit into or fragment this theory of property. For an exposition of nonrival assets 
without statutorily rival uses (e.g., data), see infra note 222. 
 129. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 64, at 75–76. 
 130. Penner & Smith, supra note 75. 
 131. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59 (emphasis added). 
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be tangible. In this Section, I analyze the rationales proposed for the 
tangibility criterion and develop a tangibility-neutral equivalent to 
generate our final working definition of legal thinghood. 
1. Tangibility As a Technology 
Douglas and McFarlane’s rationale for this tangibility criterion can 
be seen in their comparison between in personam contractual rights 
and in rem property rights. “A strict, general duty not to interfere 
with another’s contractual rights would be unduly burdensome on 
strangers to a contract . . . as it would impose unduly high 
information costs on such parties.”132 Because (1) there is no limit to 
the content of X’s contractual rights, and (2) there is “no obvious 
means for a stranger to discover the content” of X’s contractual 
rights, 133 such a general duty on Y cannot exist. 
By juxtaposing contractual and property rights over tangible 
assets, the authors then claim that “when we move away from 
physical things, . . . there is no physical thing around which the 
general duty owed by the rest of the world can coalesce.” 134 
Therefore, “compliance with the strict general duty not to 
deliberately interfere with a physical thing is much easier [when 
compared to contractual rights], as the tangible thing itself sets the 
boundaries of the stranger’s duty.”135 To incorporate this tangibility 
criterion, the definition of property would then be: 
t is a legal thing if, when owned by X: 
a) X has a liberty-right to use t 
i. X’s liberty-right has an obvious boundary; and 
b) All non-owners Y have a prima facie duty not to 
deliberately or carelessly interfere with rival asset t. 
i. t is tangible 
 
 132. Id. at 239. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 240. 
 135. Id. at 239. 
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Intangibles are problematic for Douglas and McFarlane because 
there are no “obvious means” to discover the “boundaries” of the 
“general duty owed by the rest of the world.” 136  Various 
commentators have attempted to explain this same issue: Penner, in 
applying his exclusion and separability theses onto intangibles, noted 
that “the division in personal property between choses in possession 
and choses in action may be regarded as an artifact of” the reality that 
“while the factual possession of land or chattels is at least possible, 
one cannot obviously possess a chose in action or intangible property 
like a patent or copyright.”137 Similarly, Larissa Katz summarized 
that “the more detached property rights are from physical boundaries, 
the heavier the informational load presented by rights/duties of 
exclusion.”138 Even the American Law Institute’s Council Draft of 
the Restatement of Property (Fourth) (Draft Restatement) states that 
its criteria for legal thinghood, namely separateness and lack of 
personalization, 139  “will be harder to apply to intangibles because 
there are no physical borders distinguishing intangibles.”140 
All of these analyses seem to point to the following interrelated 
problems: an inability to exclude others from intangibles; the 
nonrivalrousness of intangibles; and the increased information cost in 
determining the rights and duties surrounding intangibles. For all 
examples given by these commentators, namely contractual rights, 
choses in action, or even intellectual property, these issues are indeed 
concerning. And from this array of intangible exemplars, Douglas 
and McFarlane generalize that intangibility itself must, therefore, be 
incompatible with in rem property rights. In other words, they argue 
that tangibility is a conceptual requisite for in rem property rights.141 
Such a generalization is not warranted. Bitcoin, an intangible 
cryptocurrency described in the case studies below, demonstrates that 
the theoretical complications frequently attributed to intangible assets 
 
 136. Id. at 239–40. 
 137. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 64, at 145–46. 
 138. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 283 n. 30 
(2008). 
 139. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d. 
 140. Wyman, supra note 76, at 197–98. 
 141. See generally Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59. 
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cannot be generalized to all intangibles. As Part II describes in more 
detail, unlike intellectual property, bitcoins are rivalrous and 
non-owners can be easily excluded.142 Unlike choses in action and 
contract rights, property rights over bitcoins are indeed in rem and do 
provide a clear delineation of rights and duties. Thus, bitcoins are an 
example of a new type of digital asset that provides an “obvious 
means for a stranger to discover” the boundaries of their “strict 
general duty not to deliberately [or recklessly] interfere.” 143 
Ultimately, these new digital assets provide the counterexamples 
necessary to invalidate the tangibility criterion in property law. 
In fact, such digital assets also demonstrate how tangibility is 
traditionally assumed within the concept of possession in property 
law. For tangible assets, the logic of property law has generally been 
that “by defining things that can be possessed, complementary 
attributes are grouped together under the control of the possessor”; in 
other words, possession helps define the boundary of the legal 
thing.144 Reframed through the lens of efficiency, possession-based 
norms may be the best approximation to an efficient allocation of 
rights in the face of positive transaction costs. 145  To optimize 
“investment, specialization, and autonomy,” the possession-based 
norms are formalized through a system of property law, which 
persists “even when actual control or proximity is attenuated,” as 
long as possession is nonetheless clearly demarcated. 146  Once 
formalized, property law may then “displace possessory rules that 
would ‘otherwise’ apply.”147 
In the context of digital assets, however, two distinctions emerge. 
First, as will be discussed in more detail in Part II, the set of 
 
 142. Susan Athey, Ivo Parashkevov, Vishnu Sarukkai, & Jing Xia, Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and 
Usage: Theory and Evidence 2 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Paper No. 16-42, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2826674. 
 143. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 239. 
 144. Henry E. Smith, The Economics of Property Law, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 148, 149 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017). 
 145. Id. at 152–53 (“Property law owes its actual contours to positive transaction costs. . . . Property 
[law] is a shortcut over the [economically efficient allocations of rights] that could be achieved in the 
zero transaction cost world.”). 
 146. Id. at 156. 
 147. Id. at 157. 
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complementary attributes that make up some digital assets are 
bundled through their definitional code. There is no need for 
possessory norms to serve as the first attempt to efficiently allocate 
complementary attributes. Second, as will also be explained in more 
detail below, in the case of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, for 
example, the title is the asset. There are no possessory norms to 
displace. Thus, such examples demonstrate that physical 
possession-based norms are not conceptual priors to a fully 
functioning system of property law for certain rival digital assets.148 
These findings “expose the law’s hidden assumptions” about role 
of tangibility in property law and “to the extent that we manage to 
uncover the hidden assumptions of the law in such a manner, we 
pierce the facade of the law’s technology neutrality.”149 
But what does tech-neutral mean in this context? The answer lies 
in why property law has traditionally relied on tangibility in the first 
place. Henry Smith has argued that because in rem rights are 
definitionally directed at a large and indefinite audience of duty 
holders, the shape of legal things must be standardized so as to avoid 
high information costs.150 Non-owners know “not to enter Blackacre 
without permission and not to steal a car from a parking lot without 
needing to know what the land or the car is being used for” or even 
who the owner is.151 In these cases, “the tangible thing itself sets the 
boundaries of the strangers’ duty,”152 which makes “compliance with 
the strict general duty not to deliberately interfere . . . much 
easier.”153 
So far, we have seen tangibility used as a technology—a tool, 
method, or manner of accomplishing a task154—for two similar but 
distinct purposes in property law: (1) to delineate the owner’s 
 
 148. In fact, the entire “property process,” encompassing the concepts of “thinghood” and 
“possession,” is agnostic towards its medium, whether physical, digital, or otherwise. Marinotti, supra 
note 61, at 45. 
 149. Birnhack, supra note 32, at 90 (emphasis added). 
 150. Henry E. Smith, Property As the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1706 (2012). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 239. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Technology, supra note 122. 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/3
2021] TANGIBILITY AS TECHNOLOGY 703 
liberty-right to use; and (2) to delineate non-owner’s duty not to 
interfere. But tangibility is only one manner of delineating 
boundaries; it is not the only manner. A tech-neutral approach, 
therefore, must be a tangibility-neutral approach. More concretely, 
this means that if the characteristics of an asset entail obvious bounds 
to both the owner’s liberty-right to use and the non-owner’s duty not 
to interfere, then tangibility is not relevant; the asset is a legal thing, 
and property doctrines should apply. 
Tangibility, therefore, is not a conceptual requisite in existing 
property law and, thus, should not be a doctrinal requisite either. 
From this analysis of tangibility, the working definition of legal thing 
is now: 
t is a legal thing if, when owned by X: 
a) X has a liberty-right to use t 
i. X’s liberty-right has an obvious boundary; and 
b) All non-owners Y have a prima facie duty not to 
deliberately or carelessly interfere with rival asset t. 
i. Y’s duty has an obvious boundary 
This definition is not a drastic reformulation; rather it is simply a 
tech-neutral reanalysis of legal things. The next question in our 
analysis is rather obvious: what does “obvious” mean? 
2. “Obvious” Boundaries: Shared Social Customs and Intuitions 
To define the word “obvious,” let us begin with a cow. Her name 
was Bessie.155 In early twentieth century Washington, Mr. and Mrs. 
Garnero were out walking their cow. As it happened, the couple 
found a grazing patch for Bessie right outside Mr. Smith’s garden. As 
was the custom, they leashed Bessie to a stake and left her to dine.156 
Out of the corner of her eye, Bessie saw that, as always, the grass 
was greener on the other side; in fact, it was the greenest inside Mr. 
 
 155. There is no indication that the cow’s name was Bessie. 
 156. This was indeed the socially accepted custom of Mr. and Mrs. Garnero’s time and place. Smith 
v. Garnero, 194 P. 375, 376 (Wash. 1920). 
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Smith’s garden. She reached her head over the fence and took a bite. 
But Bessie could not stop after just one bite. She took bite after bite 
until she ate everything that was within reach of her leash. 
Distraught, Mr. Smith sued Mr. and Mrs. Garnero for Bessie’s 
alleged trespass. 
The Supreme Court of Washington began its analysis by noting 
that, doctrinally, “[i]f [the Garneros’] cow was trespassing at the time 
of the infliction of the injuries,”157 they would be held liable for the 
damage to Mr. Smith’s garden.158 Whether trespass occurred would 
be dispositive in determining liability. 
Did Bessie enter into Mr. Smith’s garden? Yes. Did Bessie 
trespass? Actually, no. The court offered two explanations. First, the 
court noted that because Bessie had previously engaged in this 
behavior without Mr. Smith’s complaints, she had an implied license 
to continue doing so. 159  Second, and more importantly for our 
analysis, the court noted that “[i]n a community where cows were 
commonly kept staked out as this one was, [the Garneros] seem to 
have followed the general custom of tethering the cow wherever she 
could find feed, relying upon any one objecting to make his 
objections known.”160 This latter point is not merely a generalization 
of the former. Rather, the court is noting that in this community, 
where such social customs are communally known and accepted, 
Bessie did not even have a prima facie duty not to reach her head into 
 
 157. For Washington’s definition of trespass at the time, see Welch v. Seattle & M.R., 105 P. 166, 
167 (Wash. 1909) (“[I]n the limited and confined sense, in which we are at present to consider it, 
[trespass] signifies no more than an entry on another man’s ground without a lawful authority, and doing 
some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property. The essential idea seems to have been the 
breaking of a close by force, the words of a writ of trespass commanding the defendants to show cause 
quare clausum querentis fregit [i.e., the burden of proof was on the defendant], and it was frequently 
called trespass vi et armis [i.e., the trespass in and of itself immediately harmed the plaintiff]. So great a 
regard did the law have for a man’s close or premises that it presumed damages would accrue from the 
breaking into or penetrating such close, even if it was no more than the trampling of the herbage 
therein.” (emphasis added)). 
 158. The court clarified that Bessie’s temperament was not relevant to the trespass claim. Garnero, 
194 P. at 376 (“[I]t need not be shown that [Bessie] was vicious, or, if so, that the [Garneros] had 
knowledge of it.”). Regardless, to clarify any misconceptions, the Court found “no reason to believe the 
cow to be other than gentle and harmless.” Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Smith’s garden. She did not have a prima facie duty to abstain 
from interfering with Mr. Smith’s garden in this way.161 
In this case, the tangible boundary of Mr. Smith’s garden did not 
align directly with Bessie’s “strict general duty not to deliberately 
interfere.” 162  Instead, a system of shared social customs and 
intuitions defined the boundaries of Bessie’s duty. I do not mean that 
the garden’s physical boundary did not play a role. Rather, the 
physical boundaries (the tangible fence) informed shared social 
customs and intuitions, which then informed the boundaries of 
non-owner’s general strict duty not to interfere. 
Notably, Bessie’s case was not an exception. It turns out that many 
cattle, sheep, and chickens roam without the permission of their 
owners. If they enter another’s property, does such entry render their 
owners liable for trespass? In answering a version of this question, 
not only did the Supreme Court of Iowa acknowledge the role of 
local custom, but it also acknowledged that “all would be shocked”163 
if the law of trespass did not accommodate shared customs. “The 
customs and habits of our people, with reference to the care of 
poultry, are so well established and so thoroughly understood that we 
think all would be shocked, to say the least, by a pronouncement 
from this court that they must fence them in, and that in the event any 
of them flew out and alighted on a neighbor’s field the owner was 
liable in trespass.”164 In a similar fowl-roaming case, the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky acknowledged that “by long usage and custom the 
people of Kentucky” could establish “a common law which allows 
the running of fowls at large without the owner incurring liability for 
their foraging,” but only if the Kentucky legislature and constitution 
do not preempt such a custom from becoming law.165 
 
 161. For a modern empirical study of social customs about residential gardens in Vancouver, Canada, 
see generally Nicholas Blomley, The Boundaries of Property: Complexity, Relationality, and Spatiality, 
50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 224 (2016). 
 162. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 59, at 239. 
 163. Kimple v. Schafer, 143 N.W. 505, 507 (Iowa 1913). For modern cases that interpret Iowa’s 
subsequent “Fence In” statute, cf. Wenndt v. Latare, 200 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1972). 
 164. Kimple, 143 N.W. at 507 (emphasis added). 
 165. Adams Bros. v. Clark, 224 S.W. 1046, 1048 (Ky. 1920) (noting that trespass occurs when entry 
is without the owner’s “consent”). 
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Since the era of these cases, most state legislatures have passed 
so-called “Fence In” statutes, which now deem as trespassers even 
the gentlest of cows and the most harmless of fowl.166 According to 
our working definition of legal things, such legislative intervention 
seems strange because it is meant to statutorily alter the boundaries 
of non-owners’ duties, who presumably do not wait until they have 
read through the most updated state codes before interacting (or not) 
with others’ property. If property’s in rem rights and related duties 
were solely derived from tangible boundaries, such legislative 
meddling should not be possible. Yet, if non-owners’ duties derive 
solely from shared social customs and intuitions, legislative meddling 
should also fail when it is unaligned with these very same customs 
and intuitions. 
In the case of “Fence In” statutes, many were enacted because a 
shared social intuition did not exist; tangible boundaries did not align 
with the diverging expectations of crop farmers and stock raisers. 
The growing economic and political power of crop farmers resulted 
in an increasing number of disputes and disagreements, which forced 
the legislature to intervene in an attempt to create a new, shared 
social custom and to instill a new shared intuition. In Kansas, for 
example, such statutes were the “products of the power struggle in 
the Kansas legislature between the stock raisers, who favored the 
‘open-range’ policy . . . and the crop farmers, who favored a return to 
the strict liability principle of the common law. In resolving this 
conflict between incompatible interests the experience of Kansas 
paralleled that of some other states.” 167  Competing general 
expectations and the lack of a single social custom created a situation 
 
 166. See, e.g., Blizzard v. Walker, 32 Ind. 437 (1869), for a superseding “Fence In” statute in Indiana. 
See Durham v. Musselman, 2 Blackf. 96, 97 (Ind. 1827), for Indiana’s previous custom-derived 
common law. Id. (“This case seems to rest in some measure upon the peculiar customs of this country. It 
is well known, that horses and cattle are permitted to run at large through the country, and particularly in 
the new settlements, in one of which this transaction took place; and are not considered as trespassing by 
entering the unenclosed lands of any person. So that the defendant cannot resist this action, on the 
ground that the mare and colt of the plaintiff were trespassing on his lands when they were killed.”). 
 167. Robert C. Casad, The Kansas Law of Livestock Trespass: A Study in Statutory Underpainting, 10 
U. KAN. L. REV. 55, 62 (1961). 
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in which the legislature’s power was invoked to reunify the law 
under a new single and shared social custom. 
The Draft Restatement (Fourth) of Property mirrors the 
importance of shared social customs. In defining legal things, the 
Draft Restatement notes two requirements: a “legal thing is a possible 
subject matter of legal relations that [(a)] receives treatment as a 
separate whole and [(b)] is no more than contingently associated with 
any particular actor.”168 To fulfill requirement (a), the authors explain 
that “[w]hether an object is perceived as a separate and distinct whole 
is partly a function of physical facts and partly a function of the 
context in which the perception occurs, including economic and 
social practices and social norms and customs.” 169  The Draft 
Restatement places physical facts and social norms as parallel factors 
in defining the bounds of property. This structural parallelism, 
however, leaves open questions when analyzing intangibles in 
property law. Although the authors aim to allow intangibles to be 
legal things,170 a consequence of their doctrinal parallelism is that 
further clarification is needed: “[w]here intangibles are concerned, 
one cannot draw upon the existence of physical separateness or 
physical boundaries to help identify things. Consequently, economic 
and social practice and social norms and customs will play a larger 
role in delineating things.”171 
I argued above for a two-step alternative to the Draft 
Restatement’s parallelism. Physical boundaries, when they exist, are 
merely one of a set of factors that first inform shared social customs 
and intuitions, which in turn inform the boundaries of owners’ 
liberty-rights and non-owners’ general strict duty not to interfere. 
This two-step approach would obviate the need for any clarification 
specific to intangibles. If the goal is tech-neutral (tangibility-neutral) 
 
 168. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1. 
 169. Id. § 2 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
 170. Id. § 2 cmt. d (“Intangible items . . . can be things for purposes of property law, provided [as any 
other legal thing] they are regarded as a separate whole that is only contingently related to any particular 
actor.”). 
 171. Id.  
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property law, then property doctrines should aim to avoid the need 
for tech-specific or medium-specific clarifications.  
One could argue that the two-step approach is merely punting the 
restatement’s clarification. That is not the case. Tech-neutral property 
law conceptually requires the removal of “physical facts” from the 
definition of legal thing. It is true, however, that the two-step 
alternative does not in and of itself explain how its factors, including 
tangible boundaries, are combined to delineate property rights. 
Therefore, the Draft Restatement’s list of alternative factors is still 
helpful in determining the existence of shared social customs and 
intuitions. These factors include: (1) having value if considered apart 
from any other thing; (2) consisting of mutually complementary 
attributes; (3) having value without regard to the identity of the 
person who holds it; and (4) being commonly transferred or bought 
and sold on a stand-alone basis.172 These factors, which the Draft 
Restatement offer specifically for intangibles, are equally applicable 
to tangible assets. They are merely instantiations or applications of 
the original requirements for legal thinghood: “treatment as a 
separate whole and [being] no more than contingently associated 
with any particular actor.”173 
The role of shared intuitions is separately mirrored in the Draft 
Restatement through its analysis “of thinghood as contextual,” which 
“is consistent with [Henry] Smith’s prior scholarship” on salience.174 
In summarizing Smith’s scholarship on salience, Katrina Wyman 
notes: 
“[S]alience” is important in determining what counts as a 
thing. Salience has a psychological dimension. We tend to 
group “the lesser . . . with the greater,” as when we assign 
the calf to the owner of the mother cow under the doctrine 
of increase. Salience also has an economic component; we 
tend to group things together that can be usefully exploited 
 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. § 2. 
 174. Wyman, supra note 76, at 196. 
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as a package.175 
In sum, social customs and intuitions can stem from the cognitive 
effects of human perception,176 as well as from learned associations, 
whether economic, social, or otherwise.177 The consequence of such 
shared social customs and intuitions is that tangible boundaries are 
but one of a number of factors defining the bounds of property rights 
and duties. The cultural evolution of shared social customs and 
intuitions then explains why “the law of nuisance, landlord-tenant, 
future interests, servitudes, trusts, private contracting, and regulation 
can at various times soften and supplement exclusion rights.” 178 
Ultimately, from the analyses above, we can expand our final 
working definition of property to include working definitions of 
“obvious” and of “shared social customs and intuitions.” 
 
 175. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Professor Henry Smith of Harvard Law 
School). 
 176. While the terms “salience” and “intuition” in this Article are used to describe factors in legal or 
pre-legal decision-making, the definitions roughly follow the definition of salience and the consequent 
intuitions as used in “the field of associative learning and value-based decision making,” which “uses 
the term [salience] to describe the . . . importance that a stimulus has acquired through association with 
an incentive outcome.” Thorsten Kahnt & Philippe N. Tobler, Reward, Value, and Salience, in 
DECISION NEUROSCIENCE: AN INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 109, 113 (Jean-Claude Dreher & Léon 
Tremblay eds., 2017). 
 177. See Rips & Hespos, supra note 118, at 1239 (signifying a cognitive effect rendering object 
boundaries as highly salient because “[e]vidence from studies of infants suggests that they understand 
the difference between solid objects and nonsolid substances . . . . At [two] or [three] months, infants 
react as if they believed that an object occupies a connected region of space, moves as a whole, and 
cannot occupy the same place as another object at the same time . . . .”); see also Soja et al., supra note 
116, at 179 (stating notably that infants exhibit what is called an object bias in lexical acquisition: 
infants more easily assign meaning and names to objects over substances). 
 178. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 1891 (noting that the authors attributed “[s]uch refinements 
outside of the core of property” to “a wider range of moral concerns, and entail judgments that reflect 
pragmatism, expert knowledge, and balancing”). 
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Thus, the final working definition of “legal thing” becomes: 
1) t is a legal thing if, when owned by X: 
a) X has a liberty-right to use t 
i. X’s liberty-right has an obvious boundary; and 
b) All non-owners Y have a prima facie duty not to 
deliberately or carelessly interfere with rival asset t. 
i. Y’s duty has an obvious boundary 
2) *Boundaries are obvious if they are discernable from 
shared social customs and intuitions. 
3) *Shared social customs and intuitions stem from 
cognitive perceptual effects and learned associations, 
whether economic, social, or otherwise.179 
The following non-exhaustive list contains examples of shared 
social customs or intuitions, which alone are neither necessary nor 
sufficient, but may cumulatively lead to discernable obvious 
boundaries of an owner’s liberty-right and a non-owner’s duty: 
a) t is treated or intuited as being a separate whole,180 
b) t is treated or intuited as having value if considered 
apart from any other thing, 
c) t is treated or intuited as having value without regard to 
the identity of the person who holds it, 
d) t is treated or intuited as being no more than 
contingently associated with any particular actor, or 
e) t is commonly transferred or bought and sold on a 
stand-alone basis. 
 
 179. The methodology of how, when, or whether perceptual effects and learned associations result in 
sufficiently robust shared social customs or intuitions to result in property rights is a field for continued 
theoretical and empirical research. 
 180. Although I have demonstrated that tangible boundaries are not conceptually required for 
property rights and may not fully align with such rights and duties, I do not argue against the idea that 
tangible assets may be more likely to correlate with sufficiently robust shared social customs and 
intuitions from which the boundaries of X’s liberty-right and Y’s duties can be discerned. As discussed 
supra note 176, physical boundaries serve as highly salient features in human perception, weighing 
heavily in the factors above. 
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Notably, this definition of legal thing seems to be the logical 
conclusion of what the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
began detailing in Kremen v. Cohen.181 There, the court held that “an 
intangible good is a property interest if it meets three requirements: 
(1) the interest must be ‘capable of precise definition,’ (2) ‘it must be 
capable of exclusive possession and control,’ and (3) some individual 
must be able to make a ‘legitimate claim of ownership.’”182 The first 
requirement, that digital assets be “capable of precise definition,” 
maps onto our requirement of obvious boundaries around an owner’s 
liberty-right to use. The second requirement, that digital assets be 
“capable of exclusive possession and control,” maps onto our 
requirement of obvious boundaries around a non-owner’s duty not to 
deliberately or carelessly interfere. The third requirement, that “some 
individual be able to make a ‘legitimate claim of ownership,’” 
highlights the role of shared social custom and intuition in defining 
legal things.183 Thus, this tech-neutral (tangibility-neutral) definition 
of legal thing could offer doctrinal certainty to courts who attempt to 
define digital property, which would otherwise be the amorphous 
“broad concept that includes ‘every intangible benefit and 
prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.’”184 
II. TECH-NEUTRAL PROPERTY LAW IN ACTION 
With this final set of working definitions, this Part demonstrates 
that certain digital assets, like bitcoins, do fulfill all tech-neutral 
requirements for legal thinghood. Other digital assets, including 
 
 181. 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that internet domain names are a form of 
intangible property under California law (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying 
Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
 182. Zaytoun, supra note 56, at 413; see also Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030. 
 183. Notably, the requirement that some individual be able to make a legitimate claim of ownership 
opens the door for the same doctrinal circularity problem as found in “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ standard,” which “is tautological and circular. Both the individual 
and the societal expectations of privacy depend on judicial rulings—while judges, in turn, use these 
expectations as the basis for their rulings.” Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 413, 413 (2014). Such possible circularity in shared social customs and intuitions in 
property law is a fruitful area for future research. 
 184. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Downing v. Mun. Ct., 198 P.2d 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)). 
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many NFT-based collectibles, do not. To apply our analysis to these 
case studies, the definition of legal thing can be converted into a 
series of questions, all of which must be answered affirmatively for 
asset t to be subject to property doctrines: 
1) Is t a rival asset? 
2) From shared social customs and intuitions (which may 
stem from the cognitive effects of human perception or 
learned associations, whether economic, social, or 
otherwise): 
a) Can owner X discern the boundary of her 
liberty-right to use t? 185 
b) Can non-owner Y discern the boundary of her prima 
facie duty not to deliberately or carelessly interfere 
with t? 
Three case studies were chosen to demonstrate how the theoretical 
framework developed in Part I can explain the non-property status of 
videogame assets and many NFT-based collectibles, while 
acknowledging that certain digital assets are indeed legal things. The 
case studies are: (a) virtual land in the virtual world of Second Life, 
(b) the blockchain tokens in Bitcoin, and (c) the NFT-based digital 
collectibles in CryptoKitties. These examples should alleviate 
concerns raised in the literature that by recognizing the legal 
thinghood of certain digital assets, a floodgate of new property rights 
would be opened. 186  As will be shown below, even amongst 
 
 185. Because X’s liberty-right to use t can be circumscribed by any regulatorily or contractually 
imposed duty which X is per se expected to understand, this question primarily focuses on X’s 
understanding of what is not t and what, therefore, lies outside of X’s liberty-right. 
 186. See, e.g., Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data: Between 
Propertisation and Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 257, 277 (2017) (“[I]f 
everybody contributing to the generation of data in a value network is vested with ownership, this 
allocation could easily run the risk of creating too many property rights, which would block efficient 
exploitation of big data in particular.”); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right and the Protection 
of Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 889 (2019) (“[A]llocating property rights to data 
producers—both individual and corporate—could create major market barriers, leading to what Rebecca 
Eisenberg and Michael Heller have described as the ‘tragedy of the anticommons.’”). 
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blockchain-based crypto assets, not all fulfill the requirements for 
legal thinghood. 
Although the underlying technologies behind blockchain may raise 
interesting legal questions themselves,187 this Article focuses solely 
on the emergent characteristics of each digital asset being analyzed. 
That is not to say that any intricacies or vulnerabilities introduced by 
the underlying technology should be disregarded; rather, 
understanding all of these features is crucial to this legal analysis, but 
the focus is on the emergent features themselves (i.e., the 
consequences of the technology, not the underlying technology 
itself). This is a fundamental principle of tech-neutral analysis.188 
Therefore, by encapsulating the engineering components, 189  the 
following description of Second Life assets, Bitcoin, and 
CryptoKitties will focus on the interface between these digital assets 
and those who interact with them, 190  describing the underlying 
technology only when necessary to explain its consequences. 
Lastly, it is also important to note that although the case studies 
refer heavily to relevant EULAs, such agreements are not dispositive 
of whether property rights and resulting legal claims exist. In fact, 
courts have even refused to enforce contractual waivers of liability 
when the core principles of property law would be violated.191 Thus, 
 
 187. See, e.g., Low & Teo, supra note 49 (noting the possible legal repercussions of blockchain forks 
on judicial judgments and the relationship between owners of cryptocurrencies, exchanges, and other 
intermediaries). 
 188. See Birnhack, supra note 32, at 39 (“Instead of naming technologies, technology-neutral 
legislation focuses on its functions or on the related human behavior.”). 
 189. By encapsulating, I do not mean generalizing or summarizing; rather, I mean encapsulation in 
the cognitive or computational sense, in which all internal machinery of a module is accounted for and 
all relevant features of the module are described solely at its interface. See Brian P. Keane, Contour 
Interpolation: A Case Study in Modularity of Mind, 174 COGNITION, May 2018, at 1, 2. 
 190. Applying Professor Thomas W. Merrill and Professor Henry Smith’s conceptualization of 
encapsulation and modularity, the “activity inside a module involves lots of highly specialized 
knowledge and information. Most of this activity and information, however, remains opaque to outside 
observers. What is important to those outside the module is what the module produces, not the means by 
which this production is achieved.” Thomas W. Merrill, Property As Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 
151, 155 (2012). 
 191. See, e.g., Miller’s Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n of Alton v. Parker, 65 S.E.2d 341, 344 (N.C. 1951) 
(noting that because bailments are subject to property law, not contract law, a “[p]roprietor of parking 
lots . . . engaged in the business of accepting automobiles for parking for hire, who required 
owner-bailor to surrender keys to automobile to facilitate parking, could not contract away all his 
liability for his negligence, though he had erected signs of nonresponsibility for fire or theft, and had 
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courts place significant effort in determining whether a property right 
is at stake before determining the applicable body of law.192 EULAs, 
however, may provide evidence of shared social customs and 
intuitions, especially when they are routinely enforced and 
sufficiently understood by the signing parties. Finally, for the 
analysis of an owner’s liberty-right to use, it is important to note that 
EULAs do create legally binding duties, 193 even when such users do 
not read the terms and conditions before agreeing.194 
A. Second Life 
As mentioned above, the virtual assets of Second Life were at the 
core of early discussions surrounding digital property. Second Life is 
a video game developed by Linden Lab (Linden) in 2003.195 More 
 
told owner-bailor that he would not be responsible for loss by fire or theft, for parking of automobiles in 
cities is matter of public concern, and it would be against public interest to give force and effect to 
exculpatory agreements which would relieve such professional bailees from all liability for their own 
negligence” (emphasis added)). 
 192. See, e.g., Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1990) (noting that 
property rights cannot be treated as “subject to principles of contract and agency law” and that the 
“transfer of executive rights [to minerals, a property right,] is best governed by principles of real 
property and oil and gas law, and not by principles of contract law pertaining to agency and powers of 
attorney”); see also Olin Corp. v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 211, 217 (Tex. App. 1984) (“[A] 
common law bailment action for negligent care of property lies in [the property tort of] negligence and 
is not an action founded upon contract [law] . . . .”). 
 193. See, e.g., Doe v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 19-CV-03629, 2020 WL 376573, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
23, 2020) (noting that EULAs are binding under California law); see also id. (“Under California Family 
Code section 6710, ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a contract of a minor may be disaffirmed 
by the minor before majority or within a reasonable time afterward[s].’ . . . However, the ‘infancy 
defense may not be used inequitably to retain the benefits of a contract while reneging on the obligations 
attached to that benefit.’ . . . Accordingly, if a minor seeks to disaffirm a contract, ‘equitable principles 
dictate that [the minor] “must disaffirm the entire contract, not just the irksome portions.”’” (alterations 
in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 6710 (West 2021); then quoting I.B. ex 
rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 12-1894 CW, 2013 WL 6734239, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013); and 
then quoting id.)). 
 194. See Cifrino, supra note 35, at 244–45 (“EULAs have been characterized as ‘clickwrap,’ a 
reference to real-world ‘shrinkwrap’ contracts that are accepted upon removing the shrinkwrap from a 
product. Upon launching a virtual-world program, users are faced with the terms of the agreement, and 
can either click ‘I accept’ (opening the virtual shrinkwrap and proceeding), or ‘I do not accept’ 
(terminating the program). This take-it-or-leave-it approach has led to criticism that developers are 
exploiting unequal bargaining power, with users not getting a fair deal for all the rights they relinquish 
via the EULA. Such agreements have also been criticized as too long and too confusing, which can 
discourage users from even reading them. Criticism notwithstanding, courts generally uphold such click 
wrap contracts, analyzing them as they would any other contract.”). 
 195. See Who We Are: About Linden Lab, LINDEN LAB, https://www.lindenlab.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/Q2PL-9QV8]. 
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specifically, the game is a persistent “virtual world environment.”196 
Such games are “‘simulated social places . . . that feature 
software-animated objects and events . . . where users employ 
avatars,’ to interact with each other.”197 Because these worlds are 
persistent, “‘actions taken and investments made in the simulation are 
expected by users to last some time,’ if not permanently.” 198 
Generally, virtual worlds also contain virtual economies in which 
players buy, sell, create, and destroy virtual assets.199 Second Life not 
only had a virtual economy but also planned to distinguish itself from 
its competitors by advertising its recognition of “virtual property 
rights.”200 This advertising approach, however, led to the infamous 
(though ultimately settled) case of Bragg v. Linden Research.201 As 
Judge Robreno of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania noted in 2007: 
This case is about virtual property maintained on a virtual 
world on the Internet. Plaintiff, March Bragg, Esq., claims 
an ownership interest in such virtual property. Bragg 
contends that Defendants, the operators of the virtual 
world, unlawfully confiscated his virtual property and 
denied him access to their virtual world. Ultimately at issue 
in this case are the novel questions of what rights and 
obligations grow out of the relationship between the owner 
and creator of a virtual world and its resident-customers. 
While the property and the world where it is found are 
“virtual,” the dispute is real.202 
Although the virtual world of Second Life was first launched in 
2003, over fifteen years ago, it is still in active use today. In 2017, its 
 
 196. See generally Second Life Terms and Conditions, LINDEN LAB (Jul. 31, 2017), 
https://www.lindenlab.com/legal/second-life-terms-and-conditions [https://perma.cc/X3JL-2CLU]. 
 197. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 149–50 (footnote omitted) (quoting LASTOWKA, supra note 36). 
 198. Id. at 150 (quoting LASTOWKA, supra note 36, at 31). 
 199. See generally Cifrino, supra note 35. 
 200. Bragg v. Linden Rsch., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 201. Id. at 595. 
 202. Id. 
45
Marinotti: Tangibility as Technology
Published by Reading Room, 2021
716 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
monthly active users totaled over 800,000. 203  According to Peter 
Gray, Linden’s Senior Director of Global Communications as of that 
year, Second Life “remains a healthy . . . business” whose profit 
“largely comes from virtual goods transactions within the Second 
Life community, and these virtual goods are at the heart of what 
Second Life has become.”204 For Linden, then, the legal status of 
such virtual goods has become more important than ever before. This 
is evidenced by the care taken in describing digital assets and 
circumscribing users’ rights in both Linden’s general EULA covering 
any product by Linden Lab and the Second Life-specific product 
policy.205  
These user agreements describe the characteristics of Second 
Life’s virtual assets, including virtual land, virtual currency, and all 
other virtual goods. The terms of service vary slightly between these 
three categories, but Linden clearly asserts throughout its current 
EULAs that, rather than property rights, users are merely granted a 
“limited license” to access virtual assets. 206  As mentioned above, 
Linden’s own legal conclusion that its users do not have property 
interests is not dispositive, whether from a judicial perspective,207 or 
from our theoretical analysis. Therefore, we must continue to analyze 
the legal characteristics of the assets in question by answering our 
three questions. As virtual land, virtual currency, and all other virtual 
goods in Second Life are governed by similar terms of service, this 
analysis focuses on virtual land, the primary asset in dispute in 
Bragg. 
1. Virtual Land Is Not a Rival Asset 
“A rival good is one for which consumption by one person reduces 
the amount of good or service available to others, as is the case with 
 
 203. Samuel Axon, Returning to Second Life, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2017, 12:30 PM) 
https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2017/10/returning-to-second-life/ [https://perma.cc/S5YS-567X]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Terms of Service, § 1.1, LINDEN LAB (Jul. 31, 2017) https://www.lindenlab.com/tos 
[https://perma.cc/5CUS-9ZKL]. 
 206. Second Life Terms and Conditions, supra note 196, §§ 3.1, 3.4. 
 207. See supra notes 193–194. 
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apples . . . .”208 In the digital realm, a rival asset “is not copiable with 
perfect remainder of the original and is not useable by multiple actors 
simultaneously without mutual interference.” 209  Virtual land in 
Second Life fails both of these requirements. Not only can Linden 
create a practically unlimited supply of virtual land, its EULA asserts 
a legal right to do so. “Linden Lab makes no guarantee as to . . . the 
availability or supply of Virtual Land.”210 Furthermore, Linden may 
create functionally infinite perfect copies of existing land, the “virtual 
unit(s) of space corresponding to the identifiers of the Virtual Land 
within Second Life,” without affecting the originals. 211  Therefore, 
virtual land in Second Life is not a rival asset. 
Because virtual land units (and all other virtual assets) in Second 
Life are not rival assets, they immediately fail our test for legal 
thinghood and therefore property rights. 
2. ‘Owners’ of Virtual Land Cannot Discern the Boundary of 
Their Liberty-Right to Use 
Because virtual land is not rival, we know that it will fail the test 
for legal thinghood. For the sake of explanation, however, let us 
assume that virtual land in Second Life is rival (i.e., that somehow it 
“is not copiable with perfect remainder of the original and is not 
useable by multiple actors simultaneously without mutual 
interference”). 212 Even then, owners could not discern the boundary 
of their liberty-right to use virtual land because virtual land itself is 
not well-defined. The total set of possible uses for virtual land and 
the set of uses which owners have a duty to avoid are both constantly 
in flux. Therefore, the boundary around owners’ liberty-right to use is 
unclear. 
 
 208. Thomas C. Brown, John C. Bergstrom, & John B. Loomis, Defining, Valuing, and Providing 
Ecosystem Goods and Services, 47 NAT. RES. J. 329, 357 (2007) (noting also that rivalrousness and 
exclusiveness are independent factors: “[a]n exclusive good or service is one from which consumers can 
be excluded unless they meet the conditions prescribed by the party controlling the good or service”). 
 209. Graf, supra note 127. 
 210. Second Life Terms and Conditions, supra note 196, § 3.4 (emphasis added). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Graf, supra note 127. 
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One reason for this is that virtual land in Second Life is subject to 
“the short-term operation of virtual worlds,” including the 
“unforeseen consequences of intentional changes or undetected errors 
in the underlying virtual-world code.” 213  For example, “a new 
interface feature in Second Life may be bugged, allowing users to 
create items that are one-hundred times larger than intended. In such 
cases, the developers must take swift action to correct the problems 
before they spread. Such action could consist of an adjustment 
to . . . objects in the world, or, in extreme cases, a rollback of the 
entire world to an earlier point in time.”214 Such interface updates are 
not merely theoretical; Linden issues press releases when significant 
changes and features are added, removed, or altered in Second 
Life.215 Not only does the user community accept such changes, it 
expects and discusses them communally.216 Thus, it is difficult to 
imagine that a clear boundary around owners’ right to use virtual 
land is discernable because (1) the underlying asset in question is 
expected to undergo visual and functional upgrades, altering the set 
of possible uses, and (2) the expected updates to Second Life’s user 
interface, altering the set of prohibited uses for virtual land. 
Section 3.4 of the EULA explicitly notes two uses that are 
allowed: (1) users “may permit or deny other users to access your 
Virtual Land on terms determined by you,” and (2) ownership of 
virtual land may generally be transferred, though it may not be 
“encumbered, conveyed or made subject to any right of survivorship 
or other disposition.”217 These two enumerated uses, however, do not 
change the fact that the mutable nature of the asset creates an 
 
 213. Cifrino, supra note 35, at 256. 
 214. Id. 
 215. For an example of an early press release detailing the changes made to the Second Life interface 
and the addition of virtual land auctions, see Press Releases: Second Life Updates 3D Online World, 
LINDEN LAB (Dec. 22, 2003), https://www.lindenlab.com/releases/second-life-updates-3d-online-world 
[https://perma.cc/YL8Z-QP4J]. 
 216. For a discussion of the 2019 updates in Second Life, see Inara Pey, Living in a Modem World: 
Second Life, Virtual Worlds and Virtual Reality, MODEM WORLD (Mar. 8, 2021), 
https://modemworld.me [https://perma.cc/943G-P8JT]; and Adi Robertson, Second Life Updates 
Graphics, Promises Oculus Rift Support ‘Soon,’ THE VERGE (Sept. 27, 2013, 11:04 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/27/4776854/second-life-updates-graphics-promises-oculus-rift-
support-soon [https://perma.cc/8CHR-KR3H]. 
 217. Second Life Terms and Conditions, supra note 196, § 3.4. 
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ever-changing set of possible uses or that the mutable nature of the 
interface renders it impossible to ensure which of those possible uses 
are allowed. The boundary of an owner’s liberty-right to use, in this 
case, is not discernable. 
3. ‘Non-Owners’ of Virtual Land Cannot Discern the Boundary 
of Their Duty Not to Interfere 
Even if virtual land were a rival asset, non-owners do not have a 
prima facie duty not to deliberately or carelessly interfere with virtual 
land. Although the EULA notes that users “may permit or deny other 
users to access your Virtual Land on terms determined by you,” this 
ability is specific to controlling the access of other users.218  The 
definition of legal thing does not distinguish between non-owner 
users and non-owner nonusers. The general duty not to interfere, if it 
exists, must be applicable to all non-owners. 
What about the engineers who have direct access to the code 
behind Second Life? Is there a shared social custom or intuition that 
such engineers have a duty not to interfere with users’ virtual land? 
To the contrary, “Linden Lab has the right to manage, regulate, 
control, modify and/or eliminate such Virtual Land as it sees fit[,] 
and . . . Linden Lab shall have no liability to you based on its 
exercise of such right.”219 As noted above, users expect updates and 
upgrades; they expect bug-fixes; and they want the virtual world 
managed in such a way that will render it enjoyable. Each of these 
expectations entails a responsibility of the engineers to “manage, 
regulate, control, modify and/or eliminate” the virtual assets. 220 
Furthermore, although not dispositive of the legal classification, 
Linden concludes and behaves as if the “Virtual Land is a limited 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (noting also that “Linden Lab may revoke the Virtual Land License at any time without 
notice, refund or compensation in the event that: (i) Linden Lab determines that fraud, illegal conduct or 
any other violations . . . are associated with the holders Account or Virtual Land; or (ii) the holder 
becomes delinquent on any of that user’s Account’s payment requirements, ceases to maintain an active 
Account or terminates any of the Agreements”). 
 220. Id. 
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license right and is not a real property right or actual real estate, and 
it is not redeemable for any sum of money from Linden Lab.”221 
In Second Life, software engineers, server operators, and third 
parties feel both legally and technologically empowered, if not 
compelled, to interfere with users’ digital assets.222 In video games, 
more broadly, software engineers retain control over every in-game 
asset for the purpose of maintaining a safe and fun virtual world. 
Even when players purchase virtual assets with real-world currency, 
“game developer companies have complete, unilateral control over 
access to content purchased.”223 Users may log in to find that the 
aesthetics, specifications, or even existence of their purchased digital 
assets have changed overnight. The technological ability of a 
centralized authority to dictate the contents, uses, and even existence 
of these digital assets means that a general duty not to interfere with a 
user’s assets in this context does not exist. Specifically, the shared 
social customs and intuitions surrounding these nonrival assets 
actually reinforce the lack of a general duty of non-owners not to 
 
 221. Id. (noting that “the use of the words ‘Buy,’ ‘Sell’ and similar terms carry the same meaning of 
referring to the transfer of the Virtual Land License as they do with respect to the Linden Dollar 
License”). 
 222. Even when describing its virtual currency, the most distinct of Second Life’s virtual assets, 
Linden’s EULA notes “Second Life includes a component of virtual tokens” called Linden Dollars, 
“each of which constitutes a limited license permission to use features of Second Life.” Id. § 3.1. “Each 
Linden Dollar is a virtual token representing contractual permission from Linden Lab to access features 
of Second Life. Linden Dollars are available for Purchase or distribution at Linden Lab’s discretion, and 
are not redeemable for monetary value from Linden Lab.” Id. Although the token “can be traded and/or 
transferred in Second Life with other users (and/or Linden Lab) in exchange for permission to access 
and use specific Content, applications, services, and various user-created features, . . . . Linden Dollars 
may not be sublicensed, encumbered, conveyed or made subject to any right of survivorship or other 
disposition by operation of law or otherwise.” Id. Importantly, “Linden Lab may revoke any Linden 
Dollar at any time without notice, refund or compensation in the event that: (i) the Linden Dollar 
program is suspended or discontinued; . . . [or] (iv) the holder’s Account is terminated for violation of 
these Terms of Service.” Id. In summary, the user must agree that “Linden Lab has the right to manage, 
regulate, control, and/or modify the license rights underlying such Linden Dollars as it sees fit, and may 
revalue or make such license rights more or less common, valuable, effective, or functional, and that 
Linden Lab will have no liability to you based on its exercise of this right.” Id. §§ 3.1–3.3 (emphasis 
added) (noting that “Linden Dollars are not currency or any type of currency substitute or financial 
instrument, and are not redeemable for any sum of money from Linden Lab at any time”). 
 223. Chelsea King, Forcing Players to Walk the Plank: Why End User License Agreements 
Improperly Control Players’ Rights Regarding Microtransactions in Video Games, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1365, 1371 (2017). 
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deliberately interfere. These assets are not legal things; they are not 
property. 
B. Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrencies are “digital or virtual 
assets that use high-level cryptography through a decentralized 
system for trading purpose and to keep . . . assets secure.”224 They 
“enable people to transfer assets directly between two people without 
any need for a ‘trusted’ third party like a bank.”225 Notably, most are 
not created by nation states and “are largely outside state control for 
the present.”226  As of May 2018, over seventeen million bitcoins 
were in circulation, with an estimated 35 million Bitcoin wallets 
(discussed below) and over 100,000 companies accepting bitcoins as 
payment.227 At its peak in 2017, the daily trading volume of Bitcoin 
exceeded $5 billion, with the “volume across all cryptocurrencies on 
Dec. 20, 2017[,] exceeding $50 billion.”228 
Unlike traditional bank accounts, “Bitcoin does not distribute 
digital monetary units to users. Instead, a public ledger maintains a 
list of every transaction made by all Bitcoin users.”229 Individuals 
interact with the Bitcoin ecosystem through the use of a “wallet,” 
which is just a set of cryptographically generated public and private 
keys.230 Each public key functions as a Bitcoin address, which “[l]ike 
a bank account number . . . consists of a string of letters and 
numbers.”231 To send bitcoins, all you need to know is the recipient’s 
Bitcoin address. “In turn, when you share your address with others, 
 
 224. Richard Aikens, Foreword to CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW (David Fox & 
Sarah Green eds., 2019). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. David Easley, Maureen O’Hara, & Soumya Basu, From Mining to Markets: The Evolution of 
Bitcoin Transaction Fees, 134 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 92 (2019). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Shayan Eshkandari, David Barrera, Elizabeth Stobert, & Jeremy Clark, A First Look at the 
Usability of Bitcoin Key Management, NDSS SYMPOSIUM, Feb. 7, 2015, at 1, 2. 
 230. For example, “13tQ1fbTMB6GxUJfMqCSDgivc8fvkHEh3J” is one such public key, and 
“5J2ae37Jwqzt7kSp9rE17Mi2LbkHXx4tzNSzbq7xDp2cQJCzhYo” is one such private key. CONRAD 
BARSKI & CHRIS WILMER, BITCOIN FOR THE BEFUDDLED 10–11 (2014). 
 231. Id. at 10. 
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they can send you bitcoins.”232 Each private key functions “more like 
a PIN: You need it to authorize a withdrawal or an expenditure.”233 
But “[u]nlike a PIN, which both you and the bank know, only you 
know the private key. The risk you take in this circumstance is if you 
lose the private key to an address in which you’ve stored bitcoins, 
those bitcoins will remain locked in that address forever.”234 
Each transaction simply records the source account(s), the 
destination account(s), the number of bitcoins transferred, and a 
digital signature. The source and destination accounts are identified 
by their Bitcoin addresses. The digital signature employs a 
cryptographic function to allow third parties to verify that a 
transaction was digitally signed by the private key associated with the 
source address, without ever knowing the address’s private key 
itself.235 The ledger onto which all transactions are recorded is called 
the blockchain.236 “Thus users do not maintain any kind of units of 
currency; they maintain a set of keys that provide them signing 
authority over certain accounts recorded in the ledger.”237  
In other words, bitcoins do not exist as entities separate from the 
transactions recorded on the ledger. An owner’s bitcoins are the 
combination of (1) the transactions recorded on the blockchain 
transferring Bitcoins into the owner’s Bitcoin address and (2) the 
owner’s ability, through the use of their private key, to transfer or 
spend the bitcoins received. 
1. Bitcoins Are Rival Assets 
To determine whether bitcoins are rival assets, it is useful to 
compare bitcoins with digital files, such as standard Microsoft Word 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 11. 
 234. Id. at 12. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Eshkandari et al., supra note 229 (“The ledger (known as the blockchain) is maintained and 
updated by a decentralized network using a novel method to reach consensus that involves incentivizing 
nodes in the network with the ability to generate (known as mining) new Bitcoin and collect transaction 
fees. The details of the Bitcoin consensus model are not relevant to this paper, but we note that clients in 
the network participate in the consensus model by downloading and cryptographically verifying the 
integrity of the blockchain.”). 
 237. Id. 
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documents. Remember that a rival digital asset is one that “is not 
copiable with perfect remainder of the original and is not useable by 
multiple actors simultaneously without mutual interference.” 238  A 
Microsoft Word document can be perfectly copied, leaving a perfect 
remainder of the original file. Therefore, it is usable by multiple 
actors simultaneously without mutual interference. Under this 
analysis, Microsoft Word documents are not rival assets. 239  Are 
bitcoins? As Konrad S. Graf noted: 
 
 238. Graf, supra note 127. 
 239. It is noteworthy that although certain courts have treated nonrival electronic documents and data 
as property for the purposes of conversion, there is significant disagreement among courts and 
commentators. See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (N.Y. 2007) 
(“[E]lectronic documents and records stored on a computer can also be converted by simply pressing the 
delete button.”); see also Integrated Direct Mktg., LLC v. May, 495 S.W.3d 73, 76 (Ark. 2016) 
(“[E]lectronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted if the actions of the 
defendant are in denial of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner or person entitled to possession.”). 
But cf. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 14-CV-748, 2016 WL 4033276, at *27 
(W.D. Wisc. July 26, 2016) (“[T]here is, at least so far, no support from Wisconsin courts for such an 
expansion of this state’s common law [to recognize conversion claims of electronic data] . . . .”); Wells 
v. Chattanooga Bakery, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 381, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (“[A]n action for the 
conversion of intangible personal property is not recognized in Tennessee.”). Some commentators do 
claim that many more forms of nonrival data deserve property protections (as distinct from intellectual 
property protections). See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & 
PRAC. 56, 63 (1999) (“Information is an asset. It is a resource which has become extremely valuable. . . . 
So the trick is to construct a regime where those who would use the data internalize this cost, by paying 
those whose data are used. The laws of property are one such regime. If the law gave individuals the 
rights to control their data, or more precisely, if those who wanted to use that data had first to secure the 
right to use it, then a negotiation would occur over whether, and how much, data should be used. The 
market could negotiate these rights, if a market in these rights could be constructed. The benefits of a 
market would be many.”); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2125–26 (2004) ( “A strong conception of personal data as a commodity is 
emerging in the United States, and individual Americans are already participating in the 
commodification of their personal data. This Article’s goal has been to develop a model for the 
propertization of personal information that also exhibits sufficient sensitivity to attendant threats to 
personal privacy. . . .”); id. at 2094 (“[T]he understanding of property as a bundle of interests rather than 
despotic dominion over a thing helps frame a viable system of rights with respect to personal data. 
Moreover, these property interests are to be shaped through legal attention to five areas: inalienabilities, 
defaults, a right of exit, damages, and institutions.”). But others note the inherent dangers and 
conceptual difficulties in creating property rights in data. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual 
Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2000) (“A property rights model for protecting personal data 
nevertheless presents many problems.”). For example, “[c]reating a property right in personal data 
may . . . be objectionable to those who consider information privacy to be a fundamental civil right.” Id. 
at 1142. Note, too, that certain scholarly attempts at granting property rights over nonrival digital assets 
do so by first converting them into rival assets. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data 
As Property: A New Construct for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 263 (2018) 
(suggesting that “[w]hile conventional discussions suggest data files can be duplicated, when properly 
enveloped or associated with related metadata and provenance, and bundled by suitable encryption or 
other controls, any data file can, in fact, be unique and incapable of perfect duplication”). The sheer 
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Even though bitcoins are part of the normally copiable and 
therefore nonrival digital realm, they cannot [be] copied. 
Instead . . . their current state of address assignment can be 
altered only with the required digital signatures on a 
transaction that becomes included in the blockchain. Such 
‘spending’ of Bitcoin is a transfer of control assignment. 
Although Bitcoin is informational, the protocol and 
network nevertheless operate to deliver rival scarcity of 
units. This enables Bitcoin to function in the social role of 
facilitating indirect exchange. It could not do so if it were a 
nonrival digital good, and almost all digital goods prior to 
Bitcoin were nonrival.240 
It is also noteworthy that Bitcoin’s “rival scarcity does not result 
from appending special legal status or technical protections to 
otherwise pre-existing nonrival digital objects”; rather, Bitcoin’s rival 
scarcity “is instead among the inseparable defining characteristics of 
bitcoins as they exist, and they exist in no sense other than as integral 
attributes of the cryptographic data structures of the Bitcoin 
blockchain, protocol, and network.”241 
Though whole blockchains themselves may be copied and “are 
therefore nonrival goods, cryptocoin units themselves nevertheless 
still function as rival goods.”242 In sum, bitcoins are rival assets. 
 
number of competing viewpoints among courts and academics demonstrates that resource management 
of nonrival digital assets (as well as intellectual property, see supra note 128) deserves significant 
attention. The question, though, is not whether such resources require an efficient management regime 
(they do); but rather, the question is whether property law, including its doctrines, underlying policies, 
and emergent effects, is the most efficient or equitable regime for this task. Although the answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of this Article and deserves further consideration, this current analysis of 
tangibility retains the traditional doctrinal requirement of rivalrousness. 
 240. Graf, supra note 127, at 57. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. To explore how hard forks may affect property rights in blockchains, it may be helpful to 
look at the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) hack on the Ethereum blockchain. A smart 
contract written on the Ethereum Blockchain launched the DAO. It “was meant to operate like a venture 
capital fund for the crypto and blockchain space.” Antonio Madeira, The Dao, the Hack, the Soft Fork 
and the Hard Fork, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2E5-5TS8]. The smart contract was hacked by attackers who were: 
[A]ble to “ask” the smart contract (DAO) to give the Ether back multiple times before 
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2. Owners of Bitcoins Can Discern the Boundary of Their 
Liberty-Right to Use 
“An individual ‘owns’ a Bitcoin if there is a ledger entry moving 
the Bitcoin to an address belonging to the individual; if the individual 
has the appropriate passcode, then the individual can in turn 
authorize a ledger entry assigning it to another individual’s 
address.”243 This transaction entry into the blockchain is the Bitcoin 
unit of value. Other than this entry, no other Bitcoin entity exists. 
Therefore, “the individual with the passcode associated with an 
address has full control over its disposition, and that Bitcoin balance 
is not linked to anything else.”244 
Bitcoins by definition, then, have only two possible uses: keeping 
or spending. This is because the full definition of Bitcoin ownership 
is technologically dictated as having nothing more than the private 
key associated with the Bitcoin address of the recipient of the 
transaction entries on the blockchain ledger. The user interface, 
unlike in Second Life, does not create the limitation of possible uses. 
In Second Life, engineers could at any point alter the virtual land’s 
visuals, possible uses, and allowed uses. Here, the cryptographic 
architecture of Bitcoin and the fact that bitcoins are merely entries in 
 
the smart contract could update its own balance. There were two main faults that 
made this possible: the fact that when the DAO smart contract was created the coders 
did not take into account the possibility of a recursive call, and the fact that the smart 
contract first sent the ETH funds and then updated the internal token balance. 
Id. “To amend the fallout from the hack and return stolen funds, the Ethereum foundation, the developer 
of the blockchain on which DAO was based, made a decision to change the protocol (implement a 
hard-fork), effectively annulling all transactions on the Ethereum blockchain past a certain date.” G. 
Ishmaev, Blockchain Technology As an Institution of Property, 48 METAPHILOSOPHY 666, 668 (2017). 
The hard fork created a non-backwards-compatible duplicate of the entire blockchain, but importantly, 
the developers did not create the hard fork to amend a vulnerability in the blockchain itself; it was meant 
to reset time before an attacker hacked a vulnerability in the smart contract. Though the new blockchain 
was promoted as the Ethereum blockchain, the old blockchain was not deleted; it is a blockchain and 
cannot be deleted by any single entity. Many users continued to use the original blockchain and called it 
Ethereum Classic. Madeira, supra. Such hard forks have raised questions regarding the property status 
of blockchain tokens, but as Graf noted, even when hard forks occur, each version of the crypto token is 
still rival. Graf, supra note 127, at 57. Each post-fork crypto token is merely the equivalent of 
subdividing a tangible asset into two, where each subdivision is valued based on the market value of the 
respective fork. No property interests are lost. 
 243. Athey et al., supra note 142. 
 244. Id. (“Unlike a bank balance that can be viewed or manipulated digitally, an individual’s Bitcoin 
balance is not an ‘IOU’ or a promise to provide funds on demand . . . .”). 
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a trustless public ledger (blockchain)245 create an asset whose uses 
are solely keeping and spending.246 This architecture means that no 
one, not even software engineers, have the ability to alter the defined 
set of possible uses for bitcoins. 
If an owner means to keep bitcoins, no action is required. If an 
owner wants to spend bitcoins, there are a finite number of possible 
transaction types: Pay-to-Pubkey (P2PK), 247  Pay-to-PubkeyHash 
(P2PKH), 248  Pay-to-ScriptHash (P2SH), 249  Multisig, 250  and 
Nulldata.251 Although these various transaction types vary in their 
output (i.e., who will receive and how to receive), they all require the 
same input from the bitcoin’s owner: (1) a cryptographic signature 
generated using the owner’s private key, which defines the authority 
to spend; and (2) a hash generated from the bitcoin’s transaction 
history, which defines the integrity of the asset being transferred, 
assuring it has not been double spent within the blockchain. 
In this case, then, shared social customs and intuitions are both 
generated and enforced by cryptographic imperatives. Users have no 
 
 245. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36–37 (2014) (“[T]he central technology underlying Bitcoin [is] the ‘trustless 
public ledger’ (TPL). The ledger is public because anyone can download a copy. It is trustless because 
the underlying mathematical rules make it extraordinarily difficult to unilaterally change the list in the 
face of an opposing consensus. It is disintermediated because no single entity can control or manipulate 
the list.”). 
 246. Id. at 38 (“The trustless ledger system permits them to transfer and hold money in large amounts 
on their own account.”). 
 247. Pay-to-Pubkey transactions are those in which “the sender transfers Bitcoins directly to the 
owner of a public key.” Krzysztof Okupski, Bitcoin Developer Reference 18 (Technische Universiteit 
Eindhoven, Working Paper, 2016), https://www.lopp.net/pdf/Bitcoin_Developer_Reference.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HN82-9VSS]. 
 248. Pay-to-PubkeyHash transactions are similar to Pay-to-Pubkey transactions, but hashing the 
recipient’s public address conceals the full public address of the recipient. Id. at 19. 
 249. Pay-to-ScriptHash transactions are those the sender does not assign a standard public key address 
as the recipient of bitcoins; rather, the transaction assigns the bitcoins to a Pay-to-ScriptHash address 
where if a redeemer has “[k]nowledge of the redemption script serializedScript corresponding to 
scriptHash,” the redeemer (instead of the sender) can then assign the bitcoins to a standard 
Pay-to-Pubkey address. Id. at 21. This transaction type is useful as it shifts the “responsibility of 
supplying the conditions for redeeming the transaction” from the sender to the recipient. Id. The spender 
does not have to know the recipient’s public key address; the spender need only share with the recipient 
the key to the redemption script. Id. 
 250. A Multisig transaction is one where “the sender transfers Bitcoins to the owner of m-of-n public 
keys” instead of a single public key. Id. at 23. 
 251. Nulldata transactions can have a value of zero and are frequently used to “to allow inclusion of 
[up to 40 bytes of] arbitrary data in transactions in a controlled fashion.” Id. at 25. 
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choice: the boundary of an owner’s liberty-right to use bitcoins is 
cryptographically defined by requiring access to the owner’s private 
key and requiring that any bitcoins spent by the owner be verifiably, 
previously assigned to the owner and not already spent by the 
owner.252 Owners of bitcoins, therefore, can discern the boundary of 
their liberty-right to use. 
3. Non-Owners of Bitcoins Can Discern the Boundaries of Their 
Duty Not to Interfere 
In the world of blockchain, no centralized authority, no software 
engineer, and no individual has the technological ability to interfere 
with anyone else’s bitcoins, and although large Bitcoin exchanges 
have emerged, Bitcoin trading does not require a centralized 
authority.253 Just as the boundaries of an owner’s liberty-right to use 
bitcoins were cryptographically created and enforced, so too is the 
bitcoin non-owner’s duty not to deliberately interfere. Without the 
owner’s private key, non-owners simply cannot spend bitcoins. This 
cryptographic requirement creates—or at least demonstrates the 
existence of—a prima facie duty not to deliberately interfere. The 
lack of technological ability to interfere with others’ bitcoins makes 
the boundaries of non-owners’ duty not to deliberately interfere 
extremely clear. 
In most cases, non-owners need not even actively acknowledge the 
boundary of their duty not to interfere because the boundary is 
functionally impenetrable. If bitcoins were analogized to the cars in 
Penner’s example, the individual strolling through the parking lot 
would be met with a forcefield around each car. This scenario creates 
and enforces a shared social custom to respect others’ property, even 
if one did not previously exist. Therefore, even if somehow a 
non-owner gained knowledge of an owner’s private key, a shared 
social custom has already been created. Each non-owner knows or 
 
 252. Cryptography, then, alongside government regulation, imposes duties onto X and fully defines 
the boundary of X’s liberty right. 
 253. See Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, & Tyler Moore, Bitcoin: Economics, 
Technology, and Governance, 29 J. ECON. PERSPS. 213, 215 (2015). 
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should know that it is socially and legally wrongful to spend others’ 
bitcoins. Non-owners have a prima facie duty not to interfere with 
bitcoins, even if they can. 
This analysis demonstrates that it is not the cryptographic 
enforcement of exclusion that makes the boundaries of a non-owner’s 
prima facie duty “obvious”; rather, the cryptographic enforcement of 
exclusion allowed the establishment of a shared social custom and 
intuition about how bitcoins are used and what non-owners may or 
may not do. This is the case even without a EULA, which Bitcoin 
does not have. 254  Therefore, even non-cryptographically enforced 
rival digital assets may have sufficiently clear shared social customs 
and intuitions to warrant legal thinghood and property rights. 
C. CryptoKitties 
“CryptoKitties is a digital collectible gaming platform in which 
players can buy, sell, trade, and breed digital cats.” 255 Developed by 
Dapper Labs,256 the CryptoKitties website promotes that “[e]ach cat 
is one-of-a-kind and 100% owned by you; it cannot be replicated, 
taken away, or destroyed.”257 Once users own a CryptoKitty (kitty), 
they “can breed, buy and sell within the Cryptokitties platform or 
race, dress, or battle [their] Cryptokitty in other Ethereum games.”258 
Like Bitcoin, CryptoKitties is also based on blockchain technology 
but relies on NFTs to represent each digital cat’s “uniqueness, 
scarcity and, of course, demand.”259 Users have spent as much as 
$170,000 for a single cat,260 one of the rarest of these digital kitties. 
 
 254. Gheorghe H. Popescu, The Economics of the Bitcoin System, 2 PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES 
HUM. RES. MGMT. 57, 57 (2014). “[T]here are no terms of service or user agreement in mining or using 
Bitcoins,” though there may be agreements to use the services of Bitcoin exchanges. Id. 
 255. Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, Cryptography, and Copyright, 47 AIPLA Q.J. 219, 223 (2019). 
 256. See Our Products, DAPPER LABS, https://www.dapperlabs.com/#products 
[https://perma.cc/DM3H-DHVQ]. 
 257. CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/ [https://perma.cc/XM9A-SBNQ]. 
 258. Evans, supra note 255. 
 259. Id. at 247–48. 
 260. See Chuong Nguyen, Cat Got Your Wallet? CryptoKitties Virtual Feline Fetches $170K in 
Crypto Cash, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/dragon-
cryptokitties-most-expensive-virtual-cat/ [https://perma.cc/6SGH-AR4Q]. This was not a single fluke; 
other cats have also been sold for upwards of $140,000. See Elisa Mala, Who Spends $140,000 on a 
CryptoKitty?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/style/cryptokitty-
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At one point, CryptoKitties was so popular that it slowed down the 
entire Ethereum blockchain.261 
It is important to note that although this case study focuses on 
CryptoKitties, Dapper Labs has relied on essentially the same digital 
infrastructure with similar terms of service to sell NFT-based 
collectibles of NBA highlights, earning the company over $500 
million in sales as of April 2021.262 Other NFT-based collectibles and 
NFT-based digital art follow the same technological and legal 
schema such that this CryptoKitties case study demonstrates how the 
NFT “craze” may be based on a misunderstanding of what rights 
consumers actually buy through NFTs.263 
Unlike Bitcoin, the CryptoKitties ecosystem consists of both a 
blockchain ledger to keep track of ownership and a separate 
proprietary, closed-source algorithm. On the blockchain side, each 
kitty is identified through its “DNA,” a single unique ID number 
assigned to each cat.264 Each ID number is unique but contains no 
information about the rarity or the features of the resulting visualized 
cat, which is generated, stored, and displayed exclusively by the 
proprietary algorithm. It is noteworthy that the CryptoKitties 
proprietary algorithm is “replaceable by the CEO [of Dapper Labs], 
for any reason at all.” 265  Newly released special edition or 
 
auction.html [https://perma.cc/Y5JB-P47N]. 
 261. Alesja Serada, Tanja Sihvonen, & J. Tuomas Harviainen, CryptoKitties and the New Ludic 
Economy: How Blockchain Introduces Value, Ownership, and Scarcity in Digital Gaming, 16 SAGE JS.: 
GAMES & CULTURE 457, 470 (2021). 
 262. 7.6 million “Top Shot Moments” have been sold (totaling over $500 million in sales) through 
Dapper Labs’ NBA Top Shop service. See NBA Top Shot, NBA TOP SHOT, https://nbatopshot.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/2XYW-KS2B]. 
 263. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The One Redeeming Quality of NFTs Might Not 
Even Exist, SLATE (Apr. 14, 2021, 4:59 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/04/nfts-digital-art-
authenticity-problem.html [https://perma.cc/L2HD-TSUT] (“[T]he ‘nonfungible’ in ‘nonfungible token’ 
refers to the token itself—that is, to the block of code that makes up the NFT, and not to the artwork that 
an NFT is associated with. . . . NFTs identify a particular digital artwork only in the most general way: 
They contain a ‘hash’ of the artwork as part of the code that makes up the NFT, and some contain a link 
to an internet address that displays a copy of the artwork.”). 
 264. Each unique ID number consists solely of an integer between 0 and (2256)-1. See Luke Zhang, 
Your CryptoKitty Isn’t Forever — Why DApps Aren’t As Decentralized As You Think, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 
2017), https://medium.com/loom-network/your-crypto-kitty-isnt-forever-why-dapps-aren-t-as-
decentralized-as-you-think-871d6acfea [https://perma.cc/6WR4-3JYT]. 
 265. Id. 
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holiday-themed kitties demonstrate that this mutability is integral to 
the CryptoKitties ecosystem.266 
Unlike Second Life’s contemporary EULA, CryptoKittie’s terms 
of service assert that users do have property rights to each kitty, 
claiming that “[e]ach CryptoKitty is a non-fungible token (an ‘NFT’) 
on the Ethereum blockchain. When you purchase a CryptoKitty, you 
own the underlying NFT completely.”267 
1. CryptoKitties Are Rival Assets 
The CryptoKitties website claims that “each CryptoKitty is 
one-of-a-kind and 100% owned by you,” and that the number of 
kitties is finite, with a maximum of 50,000 “Gen 0” kitties—kitties 
created and sold by Dapper Labs itself. 268  Users can breed an 
unlimited number of other kitties, though each time kitties breed, 
users must pay a breeding fee of 0.008 ETH,269 and the cats must 
undergo a subsequent “cooldown” period, 270  during which they 
cannot breed again.271 Thus, the time and money invested into this 
process limit the total number of kitties bred, just as with any other 
physical asset (e.g., crop or manufactured good). Each kitty’s NFT on 
 
 266. See, e.g., CryptoKitties Team, Meet a Bewitching New Fancy Cat, CRYPTOKITTIES, 
https://www.cryptokitties.co/blog/post/meet-a-bewitching-new-fancy-cat/ [https://perma.cc/DH6D-
RADP]; see also, e.g., CryptoKitties Team, Rock Out with Our Latest Fancy Cat, CRYPTOKITTIES, 
https://www.cryptokitties.co/blog/post/rock-out-with-our-latest-fancy-cat/ [https://perma.cc/5RZ2-
NCDF]. 
 267. Terms of Use, CRYPTOKITTIES § 3(B)(i), https://www.cryptokitties.co/terms-of-use 
[https://perma.cc/RZ8F-FKTJ] (Nov. 15, 2018) (“‘Own’ means, with respect to a CryptoKitty, a 
CryptoKitty that you have purchased or otherwise rightfully acquired from a legitimate source, where 
proof of such purchase is recorded on the relevant blockchain. ‘Purchased Kitty’ means a Kitty that you 
Own.”). 
 268. About, CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/about [https://perma.cc/CAC9-BZ5S]; 
WHITE PA-PURR, CRYPTOKITTIES: COLLECTIBLE AND BREEDABLE CATS EMPOWERED BY BLOCKCHAIN 
TECHNOLOGY 6, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1soo-eAaJHzhw_XhFGMJp3VNcQoM43byS/view 
(last visited June 21, 2021). 
 269. Cost to Play, CRYPTOKITTIES, https://guide.cryptokitties.co/guide/gas/cost-to-play 
[https://perma.cc/Y9AY-BS65]. On April 4, 2020, 0.008 ETH was worth $1.15 USD. Cryptocurrency 
Converter and Calculator Tool, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/converter/ 
[https://perma.cc/NN9L-KMGJ]. 
 270. A kitty’s generation determines the cooldown periods. Gen 0 kitties have a one-minute cooldown 
period. As the Kitty’s generation increases, so does the length of its cooldown period. Gen 26+ kitties 
have a cooldown period of one week. Cooldown Speed, CRYPTOKITTIES, 
https://guide.cryptokitties.co/guide/cat-features/cooldown-speed [https://perma.cc/4NLA-DMKF]. 
 271. FAQ, CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/faq [https://perma.cc/J9L9-LQR7]. 
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the Ethereum blockchain has a unique ID that definitionally cannot 
be replicated in another kitty. 
Thus, CryptoKitties are rival, just as bitcoins are. They are “not 
copiable with perfect remainder of the original” because they are not 
copiable at all. 272  They are “not useable by multiple actors 
simultaneously without mutual interference” because only a single 
user may use (e.g., breed) a CryptoKitty at a time. CryptoKitties are 
rival assets. 
2. ‘Owners’ of CryptoKitties Cannot Discern the Boundary of 
Their Liberty-Right to Use 
CryptoKitty owners cannot discern the boundary of their 
liberty-right to use Cryptokitties because the boundaries of the asset 
itself are not as clear as Dapper Labs claims. The CryptoKitty and its 
underlying NFT on the Ethereum blockchain are not the same thing. 
This difference between the kitty and the NFT is crucial, in spite of 
Dapper Lab’s assertion that “[e]ach CryptoKitty is a non-fungible 
token (an ‘NFT’) on the Ethereum blockchain.” 273  Note Dapper 
Lab’s alternative phrasing in the very next sentence of their EULA: 
“[w]hen you purchase a CryptoKitty, you own the underlying NFT 
completely.”274 You own the underlying NFT but not the kitty itself. 
What does this distinction mean? 
The terms of service note that ownership of a kitty’s NFT “means 
that you have the right to trade your NFT, sell it, or give it away,”275 
as well as the right to merely keep it in your wallet. Ownership of an 
NFT, however, does not equate to ownership of the CryptoKitty in 
two important ways. 
First, ownership of the NFT does not include the right to “trade,” 
“breed,” or even “visualize” the owned kitties, such that what is 
owned is not a CryptoKitty at all. 276  According to the terms of 
service, “your purchase of a CryptoKitty [NFT], whether via the App 
 
 272. Graf, supra note 127. 
 273. Terms of Use, supra note 267. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. 
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or otherwise, does not give you any rights or licenses in or to the 
Dapper Materials,” which include “without limitation, all Art, 
designs, systems, methods, information, computer code, software, 
services, ‘look and feel,’ organization, compilation of the content, 
code, data, and all other elements of the App.” 277  But it is the 
proprietary App, not the Ethereum blockchain, that enables users to 
“breed genetically unique digital cats, which can then be 
visualized.”278 Therefore, without access to the App, owners of NFTs 
cannot make full use of the kitties owned; owners cannot even see 
their kitties. 
Second, and relatedly, ownership of the NFT does not include the 
ownership of the visual representation of the cat but merely its 
unique numerical ID. The kitties’ visualizations are not stored on the 
NFT in the blockchain but rather are only available through the App 
and stored in Dapper Labs’ private servers. For non-commercial uses, 
the purchase of a CryptoKitty does grant users a “worldwide, 
non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free license to use, copy, and 
display the Art for your Purchased Kitties,” but for commercial uses, 
Dapper only grants users a “limited . . . license to use, copy, and 
display the Art . . . provided that such Commercial Use does not 
result in you earning more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000) in gross revenue each year.”279 If “[e]ach CryptoKitty is a 
non-fungible token,” and “[w]hen you purchase a CryptoKitty, you 
own the underlying NFT completely,” 280  then how could Dapper 
have the ability to deny users a “license” to use aspects of the kitty 
that are integral to its identity: its ability to breed and its visualization 
(i.e., the only ways to determine its scarcity and, thus, its market 
value)? 
The answer is that the CryptoKitty is not the NFT. Rather, the 
CryptoKitty is the combination of the NFT and all the features and 
uses of the CryptoKitties App, which is owned and controlled by 
Dapper Labs. The allocation of usage rights and unclear distinction 
 
 277. Id. § 3(B)(ii) (cleaned up). 
 278. Id. at pmbl. 
 279. Terms of Use, supra note 267, § 3(C)(i)–(ii). 
 280. Id. § 3(B)(i). 
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between the NFTs on the blockchain and the CryptoKitties on the 
App demonstrate that although an owner’s liberty-right to use the 
NFT may have clear boundaries, an owner’s liberty-right to use the 
CryptoKitties does not. 
3. ‘Non-Owners’ of CryptoKitties Cannot Discern the Boundaries 
of Their Duty Not to Interfere 
Although the NFT used by CryptoKitties is a blockchain-based 
token similar to Bitcoin, the discussion above demonstrates that 
CryptoKitties are not merely their underlying NFTs. Therefore, 
Dapper’s assurance that “[o]wnership of the NFT is mediated entirely 
by the Smart Contract and the Ethereum Network” is not as 
satisfying as it first appears.281 On the one hand, “at no point will 
[Dapper Labs] seize, freeze, or otherwise modify the ownership of 
any CryptoKitty[’s NFT],” but on the other, Dapper Labs “may, at 
[its] sole and absolute discretion, without notice to 
you . . . immediately suspend or terminate your user account and/or 
delete your CryptoKitties’ images and descriptions from the App and 
the Site.”282 Without the ability to breed and without a visualization, 
is a CryptoKitty still a CryptoKitty? No, it is merely an NFT. Dapper 
Labs retains the right to functionally delete all Cryptokitties at its 
sole discretion. This conclusion is reinforced by Dapper’s own 
differential usage of the terms CryptoKitties and NFTs in its 
clarification that “[i]f we delete your CryptoKitties’ images and 
descriptions from the App and/or the Site, such deletion will not 
affect your ownership rights in any NFTs that you already Own,” 
though they will now be forever worthless.283 
Just like for bitcoins, there is a technologically enforced, shared 
social custom and subsequent intuition about a non-owner’s prima 
facie duty not to interfere with an owner’s NFT. But just like for 
Second Life assets, there is not a shared social custom or intuition 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. § 3(B)(i), (G). 
 283. Id. § 3(G). 
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about a non-owner’s prima facie duty not to interfere with an owner’s 
CryptoKitty. 
CONCLUSION 
Property law has long relied on tangibility to delineate legal 
thinghood and to inform the bounds of in rem rights and duties. 
Unfortunately, property doctrines have fossilized over tangible 
boundaries, hindering property law from adequately addressing the 
everchanging landscape of emerging technologies, whether 
cryptocurrencies, NFTs, or other digital assets. The status quo has led 
to a fragmented system of legal treatments that increases the 
information cost of using digital assets, decreases efficiency, and 
ultimately hinders future innovation. 
Through the unified and tech-neutral approach to legal thinghood 
proposed in this Article, property law can embrace a theoretically 
coherent and robust way to increase its resilience in adapting to 
future technologies. Moreover, by deconstructing the conceptual 
purpose of tangibility in traditional property doctrines, this Article 
has shown that tangibility is itself a technology. Therefore, by 
applying a tech-neutral lens, this Article derived a coherent doctrinal 
test for distinguishing between digital assets that fulfill all conceptual 
requisites to be legal things and assets that do not.  
To reach these conclusions, the primary question asked in this 
Article was not whether all digital assets could be legal things under 
an overhauled system of property doctrines. Such an overhaul would 
certainly not be adopted in time to address the onslaught of cases 
concerning digital assets that are sure to arise in the near future.284 
Rather, this Article’s primary question was whether it is possible to 
integrate certain digital assets into existing property law, which was 
answered affirmatively.  
By deriving a working definition of property rights, informed by 
the information theory of property, the New Private Law, and 
Hohfeldian jural relations, this Article has shown that digital assets 
 
 284. See Smith, supra note 51. 
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can conform to legal thinghood and should not be categorically 
dismissed from discussions of personal property rights. This analysis 
exposed the law’s underlying assumptions about the role of 
tangibility and its purpose in delineating legal things and in shaping 
property rights. Specifically, tangibility has been a useful shortcut to 
delineate in rem rights by leveraging social and perceptual salience. 
From this finding, a tech-neutral (i.e., tangibility-neutral) definition 
of legal thinghood was derived. 
Legal thinghood requires that (1) an owner’s liberty-right to use 
and (2) a non-owner’s duty not to deliberately or carelessly interfere 
have boundaries that are easily discernable from shared social 
customs or intuitions. Such shared customs and intuitions can stem 
from the cognitive effects of human perception,285 as well as from 
learned associations. It is the cultural evolution of shared customs 
and intuitions that explain when, why, and how property rights are 
applicable and when, why, and how they can be limited. 286 
Ultimately, this tech-neutral (tangibility-neutral) definition of legal 
thinghood can offer doctrinal certainty to courts attempting to define 
digital property rights, which can otherwise be an amorphous, “broad 
concept that includes every intangible benefit and prerogative 
susceptible of possession or disposition.”287 
As more of our lives take place online, it is crucial that we 
understand the role property law plays as a fundamental individual 
right, regardless of its medium. Without clarity, questions over the 
characterization of digital assets quickly become overwhelming and 
potentially destructive. Two prime examples demonstrate the need 
for a clear, tech-neutral analysis of digital assets. On December 22, 
2020, the SEC announced a lawsuit against Ripple Labs, Inc. 
(Ripple) for selling unregistered securities. 288  The company had 
 
 285. See Rips & Hespos, supra note 118; see also Soja et al., supra note 116, at 179. 
 286. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 1891. Note, however, that Merrill and Smith attributed “[s]uch 
refinements outside of the core of property” to “a wider range of moral concerns, and entail[ed] 
judgments that reflect pragmatism, expert knowledge, and balancing.” Id. 
 287. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 288. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Ripple and Two Executives with 
Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering (Dec. 22, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-338 [https://perma.cc/RQ5J-PH7M]. 
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raised over $1.3 billion through the sale of a digital asset called XRP, 
but continued to claim that the asset was not a security but rather a 
cryptocurrency just like Bitcoin. Unlike Bitcoin, however, which is 
created and distributed through an ongoing “mining process,” Ripple 
created “100 billion units” of XRP “all at once.”289 Of these units, 
Ripple retained ownership of 6.4 billion, granting the current and 
former CEOs “a good chunk of it” as well.290 Without a clear and 
intuitive definition of property, the purchasers of XRP may have 
been fooled into purchasing an asset whose value and use were under 
complete control of Ripple, with some parallels to the CryptoKitties 
case-study. In fact, a hedge fund investor noted that “the increase in 
XRP value is heavily dependent on the success of Ripple.”291 An ex 
ante analysis of XRP could have clarified this situation, avoiding a 
costly and possibly destructive lawsuit. 
Another more innocuous example also demonstrates this point: at a 
time when over 300 million Americans were under stay-at-home 
orders due to COVID-19,292 the LA Times,293 the Washington Post,294 
NBC News, 295  and even NPR, 296 all reported on the “massive” 
popularity of Animal Crossing: New Horizons on the Nintendo 
 
 289. Alex Castro, SEC Says Third-Largest Cryptocurrency Was Sold All Wrong, THE VERGE (Dec. 
22, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/22/22196064/ripple-sec-cryptocurrency-security-
currency-xrp [https://perma.cc/CG9G-CLN5]. 
 290. Id. (noting that “[a]nother 48 billion XRP are held in reserve, for periodic sales”). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Holly Secon & Aylin Woodward, An Interactive Map of the U.S. Cities and States Still Under 
Lockdown — and Those That Are Reopening, BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-map-stay-at-home-orders-lockdowns-2020-3?op=1 
[https://perma.cc/97R5-QJ44]. 
 293. Todd Martens, How ‘Animal Crossing’ Was Built to Be Ubiquitous in Coronavirus Time — Back 
in 2001, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020, 8:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2020-
04-11/animal-crossing-coronavirus-quarantine-ubiquitious-origins [https://perma.cc/QAG3-BJL5]. 
 294. Petula Dvorak, ‘Animal Crossing’ Is ‘Fortnite’ for Moms: The Videogame Couldn’t Have Come 
at a Better Time, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2020, 3:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/animal-
crossing-is-fortnite-for-moms-the-video-game-couldnt-have-come-at-a-better-
time/2020/04/06/3a2036e6-780b-11ea-b6ff-597f170df8f8_story.html [https://perma.cc/BMP9-98YH]. 
 295. Ani Bundel, ‘Animal Crossing: New Horizons’ Is the Coronavirus Distraction We Needed, NBC 
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/animal-crossing-new-
horizons-coronavirus-distraction-we-needed-ncna1170521 [https://perma.cc/BUR8-XDNC]. 
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Switch. 297  New Horizons is the newest installment of Animal 
Crossing, “a social simulation game” series developed by 
Nintendo. 298  In New Horizons, “[t]he user creates a customizable 
character who . . . can do whatever they like, from lying on the beach 
to catching fish to picking fruit. As one runs around collecting 
resources, the ability to make tools and create buildings are 
presented.”299 
Notably, one of the game’s main mechanics and “[o]ne of the more 
challenging projects in the game is paying off the mortgage on one’s 
house. Animal Crossing allows players to upgrade their homes, but 
doing so requires paying off a large note [the mortgage] the player 
must take out to start the game in the first place.”300 The narrative of 
Animal Crossing centers on ownership of a virtual house and its 
related mortgage payments.  
Is the ownership of an Animal Crossing house a property interest? 
Do users have any property claims against Nintendo because of its 
restrictions against users transferring their data to a new Switch 
console or saving their progress to Nintendo’s own cloud back-up 
service? 301  Similarly, would users have property claims if the 
government, without warning, outlawed the game (functionally 
destroying digital assets which may have taken hundreds of in-game 
hours to create), just as China did in 2020? 302  By focusing on 
discernable boundaries around an owner’s right to use and a non-
owner’s duty not to deliberately or carelessly interfere with a rival 
asset, this tech-neutral definition of legal thing allows us to determine 
that, just like the virtual land in Second Life, the virtual homes in 
 
 297. Ben Gilbert, Some ‘Animal Crossing’ Players in China Are Using the Game to Protest 
Government Policies, and Now the Chinese Government Is Banning the Game, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 10, 
2020, 2:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/animal-crossing-new-horizons-nintendo-switch-
banned-in-china-protests-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/3RC4-3PKT]. 
 298. Bundel, supra note 295. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Ian Bogost, The Rhetoric of Video Games, in THE ECOLOGY OF GAMES: CONNECTING YOUTH, 
GAMES, AND LEARNING 117, 117 (Katie Salen ed., 2008). 
 301. Nintendo: Animal Crossing Fans Upset by Cloud Restrictions, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51589920 [https://perma.cc/VNE4-A33N]. 
 302. China banned the sale of Animal Crossing: New Horizons on Taobao, a re-selling marketplace, 
because the user-generated content feature was used to protest government policies. Gilbert, supra note 
297. 
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Animal Crossing: New Horizons are not legal things and, therefore, 
not subject to property law. 
Although this latter example may not be as consequential as 
analyses of rapidly evolving financial assets or new NFT-based 
digital art, it demonstrates that a single, unified, and tech-neutral 
definition of legal thinghood in property law is necessary to allocate 
ownership and facilitates social interaction in almost all aspects of 
life in the twenty-first century. By avoiding ad hoc functional 
solutions that will fragment the doctrines and policies underlying the 
law of property, this definition will prevent the creation of rapidly 
obsolete rules that would undermine the role of private law as a tool 
for planning.303 Only a tech-neutral approach will allow property law 
to fulfill what the U.S. Supreme Court held as its purpose: to 
“[empower] persons to shape and to plan their own destiny.”304 
 
 303. See Fenwick et al., supra note 29; Odinet, supra note 31 (“A single perfection system for virtual 
property . . . would be greatly beneficial in simplifying the otherwise fractured way courts approach 
virtual property.”). 
 304. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (“Property rights are necessary to preserve 
freedom.”); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) 
(“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”). 
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